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PREFACL 
Cord ia l and frieiK^ly r e l a t l o n a between Ir .cia and tl-ie 
S o v i e t unicm air .ce t h e t a i c ' - c i f t i e s have been one o- the r.ioet 
dyn<2(nic a s p e c t s o£ the £ore ign p o l i c i e s o£ the t%^ c o u n t r i e s . 
The evcrgrowiny f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between t h e t%«3 nEighbours a r e 
t h e r e s u l t of many f a c t o r s such a s the coraplementari ty of t h e i r 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s &xxc t h e c o n s t a n t l y chaxK^in^ n a t i o n a l &TU 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s . I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with the Sov ie t 
union have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been dominated by i t s s e c u r i t y needs , 
US m i l i t a r y a i d to P a k i s t a n xn t h e rrdd f i f t i e s playec^ an 
i tnpoctar* r o l e i n the es tab l i shcr^n t of f r i e n d l y ^-eActions txtween 
I.evi Dolhi -^.nd I4^cow. l l i i s nv. e n t tik. t a s r a k i s t a n Sf. cur. c 
d i p l o n ^ t i c s ^ p r o r t tr-jtu tht; iftiitcd S t a t e s on th.. Xctshr, i ' i s s u e # 
Ir.ci«i secured d i p l o m a t i c suppor t ironi t he otiier super -ov-er, the 
s o v i e t union, Ttxj S o v i e t s t o o f e l t s e t i s i i . c a s t .>eir l i n k s wi th 
2n<^^ coun te rba lanced ^s presence i n P a k i s t a n . 
The Sovie t a t t i t u d e * however* was c o n c i t i o n e c by the 
ci-^nginy p a t t e r n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . Ap^rt fra^' the fac t 
t h a t t h e Sov i e t Union saw t h e n e c e s s i t y fo r f r i e n d i n Uie 
non-coimnunist world a f t e r ttje lfc>rean c r i s i s , t l i e rc c j u l d r^ve loeen 
v a r i o u s o t lKr reas<xm fo r t u i s major s h i f t i n the s o v i e t p o l i c y . 
F i r s t , tYc S o v i r t Union nsv- have r e a l i s e d t h e t Fa i r t a n was l o s t 
i i 
t o them br cause i t ..as going unaer the prDtective umLerel la of 
tlie united s ta tes« Vierioe Pak is tan ' s acversary r ^ e ^ d t o iie 
bef r iend. Sec:jr^# wl«n Inc?ia li^d hemi Ledly hunali- ted in the 
Secur i ty Council, as a clev r d lp l ana t i c movc;# foscoi. supnorted 
t ev.' Delhi, tor ct t ha t titne, the l a t t e r needed a rrocale booster and 
the Soviet move clic^jed. Ttiird# according t o some observers 
Moscow rniciht have been impressed by ttse develSR^ments tlkit had been 
taking place in Y&ahmir, £cx sams 1 aders duritii^ Abdullah 
regime were -enorted to have l e f t i s t leai . in^s . whatever ntay hBve 
been the reason* the Soviet Union expressed a l l o u t s^sport tor 
the Ir.oian pos i t ion er.c t h a t brought inclia and t l ^ Soviet union 
c l ^^e r , 
Ecanorftic aid .^r.cl co l labora t ion in Uie f i e l d of s t e e l 
mi:!nufacture# o i l Gjqslotation and b i l a t e r a l t rade beccae nKjanxnyiUl 
only a f t e r Inc ia vms c n s i d e r a b l y impressed %with tlrjt Sovi< t 
support on Kashmir, Th Soviet Jiwves to thv.art the mer*anoe ot the 
paKistarj-Cliiria axis in ear ly s i x t i e s and l a t e r paKist«ri-Chiria«-ur 
a x i s , par t icxi lar ly i n the l a t e s i x t i e s , stK>wed some ct^jiB oi change 
in the Soviet s tance as t a r a s tViShj;it vras concerricc. Soviet 
v r i t e r s s t a r t e d unoerpla^finj tiie Kashmir question roainly on account 
of the t ac t t l ^ t they were backing the process of tt~« rorr.ialisation 
in India-pakistar, r e l a t i o n s . But the Soviet ac t ion in Afghanistan 
t o tielp rhe l e f t -o r i en t ed parchaimite fact ion led hj Karmal arsd the 
repor ted a c t i v i t i e s of the Sino-iJ c\xis on the Svjil oi. Pakistan may 
lead to some s t r a i n s on the Soviet-paKistan r e l a t i o i i s . 
i l l 
The study l^es been tfiviced In to f ive cl:v p t e r s . TliO f i r s t 
criupter deals v i t h the Pakistan tac tor in Inc--Sovi t r e l s t i o r ^ . 
TWc Soviet iJni n ' s huye s ize* i t s vast po t en t i a l i t Ir s . m the 
j e o - p o l l t i c a l s i t u a t i o n compelled I rc i^n l eade r s , Jav.ai*srlal Nehru 
i n p a r t i c u l a r to r e a l i s e , even befor^s Im i^ a t t a i ned incependence, 
the need to develop d o s e and fr iendly r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet 
>nion. Pakis tan ' s a t t i t u d e to ar.a ro le in Indo-Soviet Rel^^tiorsS 
^ti6 i t s apprehensions and suspicions on tixis score h>.ve been 
s tud i ed . 
i ssues Detween Incia and Pakistan ur.c the Sovit t apr'^oach 
and a t t i t u d e to s^ch i ' ':ucs e-nd other problems li^s ixen c iscuss td 
in the second ci^^pter. Unouyh according to soi € o k ^ t r v c s Soviet 
:nicn IIBS beer paintait . ing a neutral staiKx:- bctv^eei; .he Li.o 
cour.tri s , i t i s fv i t en t tha t t t e Soviet fjnion conci, v r s In ' i« LO 
bo 1 ore s t r c t e ^ i c in the r&i,ion of South Ap,ia ard therefore r.to»-e 
o. 'tn a l l y than paKisUsn. 
The t M r d chiinter t t i i l s v i t h pa^-Sovi^t reiatioriS and i t s 
impact :>n Inc ia , Ar attempt has been made in t u i s <ai=^ptcr to 
s tudy the inoin areas at paK-Soviet r e l a t i o n s anc how Ir.dia r.ract8 
t o moves made by these two oauntr ies i n tue i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
The Eourth chapter deals witn the age old tensions* 
suspic ions ar^ aj^rchcnsions between Incia and Pakistan and ho%v 
the Soviet (toion looks a t the c . ld ^ ar betv^en the two coun t r i e s . 
i v 
The f i f t h i s the concluaing dliapter followed by 
tibliogrciphy containing re l i vaiit sources ot tnaterial <in6 
r ead ings . Besides the s o u r ^ mater ial on wrJLch t i i is d i s s e r t a t i o n 
i s prinK^rily based* the l i s t a?.so includes such Looks, a r t i c l e s 
e t c . which have not been used £or t n i s study but nevertheless 
re levan t and therefore useful ©s further rcadinys . 
1 vfould l ike t o t iann my su|>crvi8or# Er Moha;inad Ali ^visnore. 
Reader, r^partaent of p o l i t i c a l sc ience , AMU^Ali^arii, whose 
guidance and help enabled me to complete t h i s stuc y. I am 
thankful to Professor S.A.H.Bilgrwni, Cteirn}«i., Departr.ieTJt of 
p o l i t i c a l science Cor l^lpful a t t i t u d e . I t-^ oulc l ike to t^ ^^ nK 
t.yt stt-ff of the feul-na A^ud Literary for tt*.- "^tac. and reference 
f a c i l l t i f s . My ttisnks t o fir S.H. Qaniar Ala. .:«• tyr;lr.y t i s 
d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
u ma 
repartroent of p o l i t i c a l Science ^<iss Reshaa 
AliCiarh MuSllaa univers i ty , Ali^arh 
September 193C» 
lbrO-SOVX£.l REU.TKihS MKC 1ti£ PAKXCIAL FACTOR 
i\t«R the B r i t i s h Raj i n I n c i a v,as diss.:>lv» cl i n IJ47, 
end he: sove re iyn s t a t t s oL In^'ia and pak is ta r i eroertjed, the 
'Teniliri 1?. a<3er9# unl ike t h e i r C a a r i s t p re^co '~3o ' - s , pair l i c t l e 
e t ter>t ior i to the s u b c o n t i n e n t . S t a l i n anc Lis rulin*^ e l i t e v«re 
r r e o c c i r i d with Eas t Fur Op an a f f a i r s , Moreover, they Irfarbuured 
r r e j u f ' i c e and misunfers tending about the y r e a t even t s da r ing the 
l i q u i c G t i o n of the B r i t i s h Jtopire i n I n c i a . Une/ d ismissed the 
vjjole p r o c e s s of the peacefu l t r a n s f e r of po^mr a s "a s e t of 
rew i m p f r i a t i s t devices t o r e t a i n ETi t i s t . r o l i t i c a i , *~cor^ i c , -nr? 
s t r a t e c i c i n f luence i n South A s i a " . **Th€xr do*jn^tic i n t e r pre t o t ion 
ot 056 j o r p o l i u i t a l e v e n t s , i n s t r i c t accorc wi th Kai r jc i s t - r^nin is t 
1 
t l i co ry , b l inded tljero t o p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s anc dynamics i n Asia ' . 
P. a l i n contendtid t h e t the n&t io r^ l bour>^eoxsifc i n 
coloni^^l c o u n t r i e s would s p l i t i n to the re vol i t iou ry yroup ai.t 
t h e comprcinisin«j g rov^ . In a c o l o n i a l coimtry such ^s Incxa where 
cepitaliSTsi was a l r e a d y more or l ens developed, thf canproiKisirit, 
b o u r g e o i s i e , ac^o'^ding t o S t a l i n bad come t o an at-,reervirnt wi th 
1 . G.VJ. Ch uchury, I n r i a ^ r e K i s t a n . Bancl^desh. aric the Maiot 
P9yers , CoHi« r Haan i l l an pub, Lew York, p p . 7 -8 . 
2 
imper i a l t e t t^ofwers, Tlia»# thoui»h not deeply involved in South 
Asia t the time ot Inciar* inaepeiu3enoe# Uie Soviet '<nion, clone 
along the y rca t TX>wers« iitid a coniprehensive tJrie^ry to t^Ci. up 
i t s p o l i c / tofe'ards the net coiuxbries of Asia . 
Or. Pakistan, Soviet coRsstjents were even s.ore h o s t i l e . The 
Pakis tan Qoverrs.ent v.as (described as "antipopultir , t i e d up v i t h 
t he i rope r i a l i s t s . aanir^tctj by feucal elements or.d more 
reac t ionary than In<3ia*s Qoverr*:«nt.*' The Muslim 1' ayvB, Moscow 
charged, "conuc^ed with the Earitish author i t i t s t o c i s rup t and 
thv»art the s truygle o. the people t o r liJbfcretiori, If In' ia vvas 
v i i l i f led duriny the era of S t a l i c , r^^Kistan was meaiee as ' l o s t " 
t o tri» irapt r i a l i s t rowers," Rr&ctionary and suspect in Soviet 
eyes were the h»iSi in. r i^Lioial is t nsoveRsent in I n t i a , the ce^itic^n 
of pakist«n# Bi£ the par^istani VjiOV^rnrnent's leaders t^ nc p o l i c i e s . 
The Soviets p a r t i c u l a r l y scorned r a ^ i s t a n ' s coKcept o.. "islainic 
soci ial isr" anc the "Is lamic s t a t e* as ve i l as i^s c» l l for the 
c rea t ion of an " I s amic bloc" comprisiny the MusliiS countr ies of 
3 
t l « Mlccle East ." 
T\¥a UT'R and ln6i«i es tab l i shed diplomatic relatJu^ns i n 
April 1947, four months before independence. E a r l i e r , p r io r to 
independence Kehru had r*oted in h i s f i r s t cec le ra t ion as Hit i s t e r 
2 . *>ee Hugh Seton Vvcitson, "Five Years of C>ld ^r", i n Georcje fi, 
7eeton and teorye Schvaraenberger, e d s . . The Year Book of 
l-.orld Affair^, as quot d in G. . Choufhury, 2Sj£j^» r . 8. 
3 . ?.gy ygrH T^S* t e b 17, 1^72. 
of External Affairs of t l ^ interims yovernmecfe th&t the ; v i c t Union 
v?as a neighbour with v.loro "we alt&ll hfeive to uncertake tsany cowrnon 
Las^ £> fit.f Iv ve much to do . . . " 
Hie USSF.' f.r.d r^akistan cxchat^ed ambassadors in lytO er.a# 
although the Soviet uni^n oppoeed Ceylonese tnewttership, c i^c not 
object to Pak is tan ' s entry i n t o the United h - t J ^ n s . Relat ior^ with 
Pakistan were thus established* but they vi>ere roinixrial, c o l , anc 
even i n c i f f e r e n t . (|f>ropcu3nda a s s a u l t s fror:. Soviet autr.a s ard 
me<?ia continued and both Int ia anc Pakistan reacted v^ith r s t r a i n t 
and diploP>atic r e se rve . I^ i the r country v-ishoci to offend the 
Kreojiin l e a ^ r s . In £act« thfe im^^ e^ OL the Soviet Unioi stooc 
qu i t e hiyh in Inci&. hehru Imd <,retit adroiratioi. for s;.cial vveliare 
anr ecot or-ic development i i . the \JSS^, anc' i n tlie 192c s on<5 1^ 30© 
i.e hs-d lookk c^  iavourably upon revolucion &nc tiie Marxian ciiiBlysis 
4 
oZ oapiualisni* ijfop'j r i a l ism anc Vvar. 
AS Vice-president of the interim Government c»f I n t i a , 
Nehru declared a t nis f i r s t press c»n£erri«e on 7 S!,ntenii> r lV4fc., 
t l e t i t woulc' Le trie pol icy o£ ..is '^overnpenfc to tu i lc ' up ^jooc 
r e l a t i o n s with both the 9ree»t powers—tho Sovit t iJni.>n i^ nc the 
Jnited S t a t e s . In -'ds v« ry f i - s t statement he out l ined free 
Incia*8 non-aliynec policy* maintaiiiiiK^ tliat i t wo ilc' t r y *'tC' tjoep 
ava / fron the pwtfer p o l i t i c s oi t^roiKiS alicjnrd aga ins t one 
another , which hMve I rd in the ps-st tt> \vorld \a'^-s anc^  which nay 
4 . C,h, Chouchury, op|^,^tff» pp. 9-10. 
t^  
again lead t o d i s a s t e r on an even vas te r s c a l e . " 
m December X94t the In« i^n Science C o r ^ e n s , at. the 
ins tance o t^et.ru, invi ted some Soviet Sc i en t i s t s to v i s i t 
Ir^t'ia. Tl>e f i r s t Ir><Sl6n Ambassador t o tlie Soviet Mi i. vjas eppointer 
on 21 Jux« 1947. On Hehru's ins t ruc t ions the f i r s t step of 
soundirK, the Soviet union about the establlslBDcnt of c-iplcxratic 
r e l a t i o n s had been taken much e a r l i e r . V.K, Krishna hc-non fenc 
¥,r»^^* Menon met the Soviet Foreign Hir i i s t t r , M. H_ I tov , in 
pa r i s on 28 Septerober 1946 tor the purpose. Moltov welcomed the 
6 
i d e a . 
Accordini* t o K*r.S. Mean, r e l a t i o n s b-, tween India and the 
Soviet ^ l o n a f te r Independence ma/ be dividec in to LWO phases— 
pass ive phase and ac t ive phase. Tiie ac t ive p1f«ase» in liis 
7 
opinion, besa^n m 191.5. h period o- t r a n s i t i o n may be iniarkec 
iror. Iy63 t o i JbS. In ^act# a slow che^nye cai be disce n<-d 
to^^ards tl>e rnd o: 1:^ 62 am^ ear ly 1953 In tiie l e s t rays jf S t e l i n . 
The establishment of dlplaroatlc t i e s between In^ ia and the imr'^ 
did not 1 ad t o an Imnediste development di close ecoiomic - ru 
c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s . Thf re were many psychological barri<^ r s to be 
c rossed . "Scaw? In< I'^ ^ns" , ^ rote K»F.S. Kenon# " s t i l l sa ferod 
fro'T? the fear , a r e l i c of: Br i t i sh cays, tha t tlie ucr as ;.ut to 
5 . The Stiate8tt,an. Delhi, 8 Sep 1946. 
6 . Devendre Kaushik, Soviet Relations with Incia and paKistan, 
Vikas, r e l h l , 1972. 
7 . t evs anc Views irrom the Soviet union. Nev I<^ 1 . 1 , isk . 3 , 1961. 
t u r n Uie world red by took or crook, '\n6 many Russians thought 
tliat thox^h In' ' la was naninally i r e e , she was ecorioraicall/ bovux 
3 
hcinc? anc foot t o t l ^ char iot oi' western imp* r ial l«in." 
The varminy of Indo-Soviet re la t io i i s i n l t l a t e c a TK^W era 
o. c u l t u r a l , ecoiXHt^ lc* m i l i t a r y , <=ind diplcamatlc cooperation, Ti^ c 
Soviet Union alv-a/s emphasizes the ifnp>o* tance ot cu l tu ra l 
uncferstanking i n achieviiits c lose r r e l a t i o n s with anotlK-r country, 
and Incla i n the raid 19bOs as r» exception. Since I9bt there 
i-jfcs been a regu la r , annual exchar^ie of delt^atioriS oi^  s c i e n t i s t s , 
a"" t i s t s , wr i te rs ^nd others between In<dia &na tiie Soviet Union. 
Until the roid-19i.O I n d i a ' s economic r e l a t i o n s v»ith tYvs 
Soviet union were confined t o t r ace , but t h i s clj^nyed with the 
improvement of r e l a t i o n s , ttow much emphasis was la id on Soviet 
he i r in cap i t a l osnstr«JCtion and development ot h svy industry• 
In Septembs r 1954 the USSR indicated i t s villir^^nt s s to a s s i s t 
I r d l a in constructlnc, a s t e e l Mi l l , .:nd in February 19LL an 
agreement was siyned for the much publicized s teel ^5ill in Bhi la i . 
India hf d received external help during i t s F i r s t Five Year Pl-r,, 
lauiiched in l-^tl , frcxn the v.est. t^rin^ the Second Fi .e /car i Ian 
est( rn a id continued t o be much hii^her, but Soviet a s s i s u nee vas 
s i g n i f i c a n t . Between l^dvember 1957 and February l^^bl the usr.R 
exten<^d c r e d i t to Ir cia t o t a l i n g $&70 mi l l ion . Soviet «id in 
In<ia*6 i n c u s t r l a u d a t i o n programme ^as even more extensive 
8. K.P.S. Menon, T.enin Ihrou h Incian Eves, r e l h i . 1^ 7*^ , 
T:^, 67-8; a l so see Devci^ra Kejshik, o p . c i t . , p . 2... 
curing .he Third Five Yeer Flan. Most ot the Soviet «iia ^ as 
9 
u t i l i z e d t o r i n d u s t r i a l c^velopwent. 
Incia obtained a larc^e amount of ecoi.omic ass i s tance 
fr©i» both thp JSSR anr the / es te rn countr ies ciurir^y tl*^ heiyht 
o the cald war in the 19bOs because of ii-s special ro l e as the 
leader of the " th i rd bloc" . Thn>uyh tiie 1 9 ^ s ln< ia and Lt,/pt 
received ftsore Soviet arms anc ir . i l i tcry equipment than any other 
non-cofnipunlst cx)untri. s . in the inic-19SCs, when Pakistan bec t^in to 
rece ive "JS arms tlirouyh various mi l iary pacts« a powerful sec t ion oi 
the In< .^iar. publ ic s t a r t e d to caropalyn in favour of s o l i c i t i n g 
Soviet m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . Itehru, however was cautious in 
relyincj so le ly upon one super power for mi l i t a ry ass i s tance 
end although Soviet arms ass i s t ance has increased enormously, 
b i s pol icy in t h i s respect i s s t i l l folloinNSd. 
In 1956, Kehru and h i s governnu^nt's a t t i t u c ^ to^^arc* 
Soviet a t r o c i t i e s in Hungary vas mild <xwnpar d to t he i r severe 
cond^onation of Anglo-Frencii-israeli ac t ion in Et^ypt, "Tl£i 
Huns^arian c r i s i s " , as one catr.-.entator put i t , "procuced e ..uch 
discussed i l l u s t r a t i o n of t\K Indian leader*3 k i n d y trcatir^nt 
10 
of sovie t tnisdeecs" . 
9 . G,y. Choufhury, o p . c i t . . p . 22. 
IC, See F^ul F . Fov.er, " I ro ian Foreign pol icy : The Age of l^hru", 
Review of p o l i t i c s . April 1964, p . 274. 
In tiie Ji. General i»3ser,bly InCla* alorie amoiiy the 
non-coinmiinist countri* s» voted with the Soviet bloc a_,ainst a 
r e so lu t ion ca l l iny i'or free e lec t ions in Hungary, I!ehru# vhose 
foreign pol icy was for the f i r s t time c r i t i c i z e d ins ide his 
country for i t s "arpar* nt duial standard of morality*', t r i e d t o 
Jus t i fy the Incian vote a t the UN on the c^rounda that a UN 
supervised e lec t ion in Hungary rait,ht c rea te a haa precedent 
elsewhere. Kashrir was obviously .-.is concern. He eventual ly 
responced t o the c r i t i c i sm a t home and abroad by modifyin, h is 
s tand , l-ater he tolc the Indian r a r l i a n e n t tha t the yrea t majority 
of the Hungarian people vanted a change of governr-ent and t h a t 
the Soviet forces whici* had si^pressed t t ieir r e v o l t should be 
withcrawn. In response, t t e Soviet government, pointedly reminded 
Nehru oi I n c i a ' s niany p r t s s iny domestic problems, particul<arly 
the Kashmir problem for which Soviet help ^^a ces i rcd . Simile ly 
when N hru expressed concern i n May 1958 over tlw worser«iny 
Soviet-Yugoslav r e l a t i o n s , premier Khrushchev woS reported t o have 
t o l d the InfUan Ambassac^r tha t India should not i n t e r f e r e ; the 
Soviet cjovernnent a l so resented Kehru's l a t e 19bd a r t i c l e "Tlx^ 
Basic Approach", which c r i t i c i z e d a l l dogmatic ideolo^ i e s 
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it.eluding coiwnunisin. 
Kehru's act ions regarding the Suez c r i s i s were le«;8 
ambiguous. The I s r a e l i drive across the Sinai i^^ninsula arjd the 
B r i t i s h and French landins^s a t the canal were l abe l l ed by the 
1 1 . G.V,. Chouchury, o p . c i t . , p . 24. 
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prijne Miniater as "a f lagrant v i o l a t i o n o£ the UN charter" and 
a "clear and mked aggression" . But when Bulganin wrote t o Nehru 
sut^gesting j o i n t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n against BritAin, France and 
I s r a e l , Nehru demurr€d« saying,, that any s t ep that might lead t o 
worlc war would be a crime against huroanity. 
Thus Ind ia ' s p o l i c i e s genera l ly favoured Moscow duriny 
1954-1962# and the S o v i e t s dropped the ir n e u t r a l i t y on the Kashmir 
dispute and openly and unequ ivo^ l ly supported I n c i a . 
¥. r between India, the befriending ot which Ised enabled 
the USSR t o gain much inf luence in the t h i d world, and Chir^, 
f ra terna l member of the communist b loc , i n i t i a l l y s tra ined the 
Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s that had developed s-> wt l l Cuiiiiv^ the 
preceding e i g h t y t a r s . Khrushchev described tfie bcsrc^r f i gh t ing 
12 
as "an outr ight godsend for the i m p e r i a l i s t s " , cno he i^6 
good reason t o despair about a c o n f l i c t in which he d i e not 
have t o favour one s ide over the other . 
pr ior t o the war, India had hoped that the JSSR would 
r e s t r a i n China and i n the event of a major armed c o n f l i c t , remain 
n e u t r a l . This hope was not e n t i r e l y without foundation: 
the Soviet union did not want t o l o se the c lose fr iendship of 
1 2 . Pravda, Dec 13 and 25, 1963. 
IncUa ai.c' ntcake I t 'ook to tlir • emt for l ^ l p . Ttic U*" " nx-de i t s 
pos i t i on cliLvtr oi Septemfxr 9# 19lv# three years bi fore t t ^ 
outbreak OL uar , rec lar iw. Cor the f i r s t time Uiat i t tsoK c. 
neut ra l pos i t ion in c-^nflict be tv^een & cotmnunist sim e non-confrunist 
country. But when tht wc-r erupted in t.he micst o^ the Cu < n 
c r i s i s , utiity v i th in tlie cos^Riimist LIOC against the est* rr» 
countr ies vas vival* anc' t-uc Soviet Union ^telt compelled t o 3f»otv 
some i r a t e r n a l Ifeanin^ towarcs FeKi.n>sj. 
On October iii>, 1962, rravca and Izveat ia praised as 
"const ruct ive" Cham's tliree point p ace proposal o October 24, 
a proposal a l ready dejected Ly Ir.c'i«, anc imp l i c i t l y L,laroed In< i a . 
The Soviet press ric" not condemn v.hBt tinn Imit ins rc-^crrcc as 
Chinese aggrers i^n, ar.«^  i t enctorsed the CUxnere views on UJC 
McM^^ hon l i n e . I n f i x ' s eas te rn bouriCr-ry with Chiiia. 
DuriiXj the period t h ' t follov.ed not only f id Sinc>—Ipcian 
relatinfiS d e t e r i o r a t e , but the r e l t ions between ln< ia . r^ d the 
Soviet tJnion vjere strentjtners ci consicerai , ly. Fr-jft^  nov- on'arc's 
more sovie t 1 aders beyan to v i s i t Incia <^ia asrong thoce were 
Khrushchev, iire-^linev, Posyvin, Suslov, Kozhlov, < m KiK~jyen. 
In teed, Khrushchev prcfe r- d t o be i n I r ' ia oi. the occasion o. 
the i c t h anriiversary o^ the Si»j-Sovi' t A<jreeuent o- i n o n c s h i p v.nt 
All iance of lybO, which incidents ac«>rcii.^ co e l* adii.v, expert 
or ChirK se ati .£iirs, ten<fed to add t o f-feo's i r r i t a t i o n ac,ainst 
10 
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Khrushchev am" In<;ia» 
'.iKin tlic Sino-Zncian c i s p u t e could not. i;e r e s o l v c 
p e a c e f u l l y , MBO, tear h i s own reaso i^# launched « lt-r:,c s c e l e 
a t jg ress ion on I n c i a i n Octoiaer 1962» Hiere uas r^othin. to sUov* 
tht^t. f u s s i a oxhi t - i ted e i t h e r p r o - l n c i a o r pro-Chir»i ueb-viour 
i n s t a n t l y , Ko Sovie t paper c a r r i e d any riev.s o* Uie S ino- ln t i a n 
waT in t h e fol lcn. ing two c^ays* hhen the Chinese f o r c e s were on 
t h e Ir.r iQr. s o i l , tlie American p r e s i c e n t <3eclart d t'tm Cui^n 
tlockfticle frirxa 24 Octoi3er 1962 t o t h e s h i p s carryj .n . v;ar rnatf r x e l 
t o CuLo. Tl^ ie Cui^an falocK«ice, s o r e t han the Sit;,>-inf i an v a r , 
was a biv, embaTessRient t o t h e F^usoiarjs* Unlikt, clasiKSs on the 
I n c i a n f r o n t i e r , i t came v^ > sudclenl/ anc unexpectedly , ^nc i t 
p l a c e d the sovi- t I c a d c s i n an unev i t ab le prediCffltsent. Uix p«r the 
ccsnpulsion oi revelopmcnts on ;.hc Cu. an front# Russia nn-c'e uic-. 
14 
f oves i n the S ino-Int i s n fear t o o . 
This t u r n i n t h e Sov ie t p o l i c y towards Inci^i , hov«ver, 
cane t o at. e a r l y end wlaen LliC cause wl.ich brought it, i n t j 
e x i s t e n c e h^id s u t s i d e d . p r e s sed v.ith t,he /anericca, cjnfr^;nLation 
on Cui.a, t h e Rus'-ian p o l i c y t o rc i l ly her a l l i e n rjiunc ht r 
continuEid so loritj a s i t hacl a mind t o cneet tlie US clfc-ller*^e. 
hhen, i.owev' r , i t s CuLan p o l i c y ch<-inycd ciiO Kussie c3ccitVd t o 
1 3 . S i s i r Cupta , " I n c i a emcl t lv Sov ie t Jni-.n", CUT rc-nt H io t a rv . 
Ma'-ch 1-^63, p . 14t>i Also see J .A. l5BiK, Sovie t Po l i cy ToTaros 
Irif 'ia; i ror . S t a l i n t o frci-hi. v , ViK«s^ r e l h i , 1.'70, p . 152. 
1 4 . J . A . ra iK, p p . c i t . , p . 154. 
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withdraw the miss i l es frcjin CuL-a« i\.8 policy ir. the Sirto-lnciian 
war onc^ c^ c^^ ain unc^rwent a (d:)Eiiige. when thue tins Soviet 
a u t h o r i t i e s decided the CutAxi policy once ioc a l l they made \jp 
t h e i r mind t o res to re the e a r l i e r Soviet pol icy oi neu t r a l i t y 
15 
i n the Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t . 
Iri orcer to resolve the problefss between Incia and F^Kistan 
and cre£^t.e condit ious in whicdt both would be joined to the Soviet 
unisi in t i e s oi friemlship and in a benev^l^^nt re la t lor . sn ip , 
Sovlf t pren i r Alexic Kosyyin took the i n i t i a t i v e in arranc^int^ a 
hiyh level confererice Let%«een In<^  ia and Pakistan (in J.-nu^-ry l-t>fe, 
a f t e r the ly6£ Indo-pak war) in which he himselt actjuvely 
p a r t i c i p a t e d . The conference, rrieetirib s t Tashkent anc attended 
by the Indian prime Minister I*»l Bahadur Shas t r i and paKistan 
president Ayub Kh^n wiUi t n e i r senior aides# grappled Viith tiie 
i ssues civic^inj the two countr ies and a t c ruc ia l moments vtten 
deac'lock threatened t o s t a l l i.urthi.r procuress, Kosjyin's deft 
in te rven t ion samjd i t frow fa i lu re and f i na l ly resu l t ed on an 
Indo-pak dec lara t ion and vi-rioua other a l l i e d agreements, ftoscow 
appeared t o have scor«^d ar. iropcMTtant diploroatic t r i u r ^h, and t o 
have consic^erably advanced i t s object ive o_ taking the e n t i r e 
16 
subcont i i^nt together with i t i n t o the internatiori.>l urena. 
IL. I b i d . . p . Ibh, 
16. V.F. Dutt, I n f i e ' s Foreign Policy, Vi.-as, r e l n i , 1.34, p . I . e . 
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The success a t Tashkent* even thout^h the at,reeinent.s v?ere 
soon s ur <3 Ly l&ck o£ follow-up p 'ogress in any area aruj tine 
r e t u r n a- recr iminat ion anc hos t i l e propa-.cma, encDuraj-^d the 
Soviet bel ief i n th& p o s s i b i l i t y ot j o in t fr iendship v,itii i n t i a 
anc' ptikistan as a va l i ab le r e l a t ionsh ip in tl«! internestional 
s t r u j g l e . Lo,.i'~aHy, thr Soviets f t l t the r^ed of mekirK some 
more tangible presence in paj-ast^n; only then could vhey o p c c t 
t o c i r n ary levera^^e with Islamabad. So csroe tlie Sovie't ocor.or!.ic 
a s s i s t ance t o Pakis tan, £ lbe i t a t a much more l imited sca le than 
tlriat to In^i®. But Pakistan could hardly Le content with t lK t , 
t o r i* s rea l requirement V(a8 m i l i a r y s t rength e^ains t I n c i e . 
pak oressure on KoSc ow mounted ai.c the Soviets t e l t oblic^ed t o 
advance sonte way towards Islamabad's pe r s i s t en t requests in orcer 
t o ensure t he i r leverage. 
Another factcar merits r.otice in t h i s evolving, Sovlet-ra^ 
r e l o t i ^nship. The 1964-67 p t r i o c was a l so one o£ increasinc, 
In^ lsn dependence! on the United S t a t e s . The rr.ili ry reverses 
aii,ainst China followed by the ecor-onic c r i s i s l*^d sen t In< ia 
scurrying t o uashington fear mi l i t a ry end ecofiomic a i d . Althou^^h 
both LBl Baliaour Shas t r i and Im i r a Gandhi shov^ed keenness to 
maintain the Soviet opt ion, the rit^htwing swiny in Uie policy 
durintj t h i s period xvas pa ten t ly obvious and was gem. a l l y regardrd 
as the inev i t ab le conseauence of the tu rn towards the United 
s t a t e s . Possibly, the Soviet i n t e r e s t in Pakistan was a reminder 
an6 a response - a renrin^er t o India of Soviet optior^ in case the 
13 
Indian t i l t tov/ards Washington went too f e r , anc, a rcspansc to 
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Indian (domestic and foreign pol icy developments. 
AS the nevfs a tou t possible Soviet supply of at me t o 
paKistan car^c to be Nnown, a nev. s i t ua t iu i . as created for Ir<i^» 
E a r l i c ' , re!;ist.an ifio successfully lobbied with tue uiviteo States 
i t s needs for secur i ty o.^ainst In t i a aud oy assurr.in^, an a i . t i -
ccrrr.ur.ist posture^ anc, tiierefore cssuni- d l a rye-sca le arms 
18 
a s s i s t ance tror.' i«ashinyton. 
This envelopment was takirx, shape notvilttiStendirXi ttie 
e f f o r t made by Mns. Gsn^il to t r y to r e t a i n the Soviet frientjship 
even » hen India had been obliged to tjo in t o r large scale IJ 
a s s i s t ance with c e r t a i n conseqv:«nt s h i f t s i n Int ian p o l i t i a l and 
ecoroinic p o l i c i e s . She had matie a bsrief s t c ^ ir. Moscow on tK.>r way 
i,acK Lrom tlie v i s i t t o the i n i ted States in the begiimin^ of 
n p r i l , 1 J 6 6 but a more formal v i s i t took plc.ce during 12--1& July 
1966. Reporting on her v i s i t t o parlisraent on 25 July Mrs .Gandhi 
z^aid t r a t she had c iscuss td in p&rticolar the post-1 shKe nt 
development in r e l a t i o n to Inc ia and paij.8tan with pr^nior Kos/<^in 
and the CPSU Gex^ral Secretary iconic Brezhnev. Her v i s i t had 
been preceded uy t t e v i s i t s ox. t he Indian pl«-ui.inLj am i ood 
Minister to Moscow in re^^ard t o Soviet a id fear t t e Fourth Five Yea* 
p l a n . 
17 . rev Kurari.a's despatcii from Moscow **Russi'^ns i t n r Swir*, t o 
Right in Inc ia" , Indian Exprens. 17 Tec 1966. 
18. V.P. t t i t t . , o t j . c i t . 
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I n d i a ' s Concern on the Soviet Anaa Aid to Pakistan 
The oroblem was now very rouch with India anc only ao ju i rec 
more ser ious dlnensior^ in these two years . The Soviet stratt-t^y 
c l e a r l y vas t o cjradually r a i s e tt>e level oi r e l e t i o r s h i p -with 
rai^istan while sicnultaneously expancing ass i s tance to Incx'^  in 
order to auieten Indian miscsivinys and soften her opposition to 
a l imited amount, of anas 8v^-)ly t o Pakistan. The Soviet r^dia 
and puul ic proiK>unc€ments a l so tj^derlined the- desire b i l i t y of an 
Ineo-pak raprroacliment. A3 for instarace* as - a r ly as recetr.ijer 1965, 
3 Pravra a r t i c l e had cltiimed tha t a sett leinent of ti^t^- conf l i c t with 
t '^kistan vvas v i t a l to Ind i a ' s economic advance and success in 
19 
masterin-j her present problems and d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
Thuse thenes were repeated in the next two y a r s but the 
issue became wore ser ious for Ind ia . Itie r^inister -or e x t e n d i 
a f f a i r s , M.C. diagla to ld t t e ^ajya Sabha on U Ati-,ust lS«o7 trtut 
the sovie t Union hc^ d repeatedly assured lndi«» tf»at i t would not 
s e l l l e t h " l t«eapons to Pakistan and tljat the t ie l icopters repoorteoly 
so ld t o pai^istan could Le i urchased by any country on a cof^rercial 
b a s i s . He sa id hel icopters did not f a l l v.ithin thr cetc-xjory of 
l e t h a l weapons. He t e ld out t t » assi^ance tliat " the re i s a t so lu t e ly 
no change in the USSR's attitu<Je towards . ^ . < '^xr friends nip 
continues Vvithoat beln-,. lessened or ijeii.^ surrounded by oubts 
19 . Asian Recorder* o-14 January 1966, p . 6263. 
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or suspicions . . . the OSSP i s ir.ost anxious tii^at t t n s ioh m t h i s 
20 
area shoulc be reduced." 
The Indian leaders appearec to be more anxious to yive 
assurances on behelf of Moscov; than Moscow i t s e l i , I t ^ r e v.as no 
f'oubt t t ^ t the problem was there with Incia and i t was not v,oing 
t o be vished awcjy. Despite increasirx; concern in Incia Moscow hac 
c>clded t o s t a r t a nnall->8CQle mi l i t a ry Suppli* s pro j^ramnn- to 
pfiKistan. A paKistani mili^ ry mission led b / t^ie then 
Co^iwender-ir-Chief of the array, C en. Y«hya K.^n, pair a te i cay 
v i s i t to tfrie Sovi<E't union durin^j 28 June-July lv6a anc it. was 
ind ica tec on 8 Ju ly 1968 t h e t before the deleyation l e f t , i t it&e 
secured Moscow's promise to r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance . 
The news about the Soviet <^clsion created an uproar in 
Ind i a , when iriformed of the decis ion, Rrs.Ganchl v.rote to rrf-mier 
Kosyain on 10 Ju ly 1^68 pro tes t ing against tne Sovie t decision and 
point ing OJt t h a t a Soviet st^sply of arms to Pakistan v.culc 
br ine the c lose , f r iendly Into-Soviet relatior»ship unner tension 
and s t r a i n . In his reply Hr Kcey,,in made no c i r e c t reference 
t o the reported decision to extend arms a id to psKistan, but 
repeated the Soviet argument t h a t even if the soviet Union oecirec' 
t o give soene m i l i t a r y hardware to paMstan, i t voulc be cone in 
21 
the l a rge r i n t e r e s t s of promotins^ peace in the recjion. 
20 . The TiiTies of Inc i a , Lew Dc^lhi, 9 August 1967. 
2 1 . V.P. Dutt, o c . c i t . , p . IDS. 
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The I n c i a n ^ovenanent con t inued t o nount c ip lc rnc t i c 
p r e s s u r e on Hopcow and In Auyust 1:^ 63 t\k lMi<->n . r e s i t e n t 
r r z e k i r Kussain %^nt. on a v i s i t t o t^^ usf^ ' . A? oarr^r t ly *. .j'jo< 
I i l l v i s i t , th* circumstance:s oi tru? tisnirA, coulc not ix 
ciacountfjd on<? the t^e D£ the oppor tun i ty t o f o r c e f u l l y -^ut 
. orv^ard I n d i a ' s apprehens ions coiald not L ve t*„en p'^'Ssco ap, 
T. s s e c t i o n Oi. t.£ or-os=it i^n t i . i s v.as only uxtot,h( r prooi 
of UJB f a i l u r e o l Ir.cioi^ i oreic,n p;^licy where ce ou ht t o t»ove 
been tu rned tcfe^arc^ the v e s t . Thv. j a n Sat^^h leacfer ?«r »tal Efetiari 
Vajpayee xas c r i t i c a l or vtit cfevelopoiiLnt anc c a l l e d i t "<. c l e a r 
case of b e t r a y a l uy r^ co^*'# -^ItitOtKin J:^  reco%r»iset t te - t li.< i a 
c o a l d not yo either t o USA or Chir^ oS x.t^^ were both I r e a c / 
c a a i t t e d t o f^r.LsUiii, iSc fe-ant- o Irciia t o enc i t s "sh^irc or J -
S o v i e t i . ias" anc t o t u r n t o Europe, i r anee , ano «jst r n iu*^a-c, 
anci a l s o t o manufacture nucl a r . earwafiS i n o r c t r t o <evel jp 
A 2 
independent s t rengt f t and c a p a c i t y . TivB r s r I t a c e r ( l a t e ) Jot t j l a i 
a l s o coriSi«%red t l « Sovie t jsove a s a "L«ilurG ot lndi«r ciplor.*. cy" 
t o r i t had not b ten i n t t e p a s t on a "f i rn . n o l i c y o. e - iU-^ i t i , 
i r i e n d s h i p <m s e l f i n t e r e s t , " The ur.£5? a s s u anc* s to iin xa t'.<at 
Ltie supply ol arsBS need n j t came i n the v^y of tis*. i r f r i e n d s h i p 
23 
would convince nobody, he s a i d . 
2 2 . See Vajpayee 's s t a t e s t n t i n Asian RCCQ» d e r , 12-1 j /»u«, j s t ly6 . 
p . 8467, und a i s 1* t t e r t ^ the priine Min i s t e r i n i^ctiona;|, 
\^^<'l<^i 12 J u l y 1^68. 
2 3 , The Hincustan Times, 14 ^^nc 10 J u l y ly&d. 
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Tte Communist party of Incia pleaded for a "sober approach" 
anc con<ten»ned those elements "who were try ln^ to whip up an a n t i 
S o v i e t move t o ch&nge the d i rec t i on of I n d i a ' s fore ign p o l i c y " . 
Both the corncsunist p a r t i e s Refused t o endorse any censure motion 
a g a i n s t the government of t h i s i s s u e . The matter came up for 
d i s cuss ion among tl"« o f f i c i a l s of the tv.o countr ies durin<a 
pres ident G i r l ' s v i s i t t o the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1970. 
The Foreign Secretary, T.R. Kaul'n t r i p t o Moscow i r l a t e 
October vas a l s o l inked with the quest ion of Soviet p o s i t i o n on 
Chinese claims on Incian t e r r i t o r y and Soviet arms supply to 
Pakis tan. On both tive counts i t v^s reported that the Foreiyn 
Secretary had brought back the ioqpression or modi i i cat ion of the 
Sov ie t s tand. The Foreign Secretary a l s o caine back with the 
impression that as fer as Soviet a id to Pakistan v«as concerned 
the mi l i tary si;$jplies under the o ld contract had ended by 1970 
and that no fresh contract had been s igned . 
yhe Pakistan factor and tyte Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1^71 
The Indo«-Soviet i f e a t y for 20 ytrars '*«s concluded i n a v^ry 
s e n s a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n faced by India . Th^ ^ v^r between the two 
winys of Pakistan over the Bangladesh i s sue had forced more than 
10 m i l l i o n refugees from East BenQal t o seek s h e l t e r in I n c i a . 
India t r i e d i n vain to pursusde the in ternat ional agencies anc 
the US t o preva i l on Pakistan t o f a c i l i t a t e the return ot the 
re fugees . Pakistan was encouraged by the US and China in i t s 
attempt t o crush the revo l t in East Pakistan. In 19 70, the US 
18 
suppl ied arms t o Pakistan in v i o l a t i o n of emlaargo. Henry Kissinger 
went to Peking and Klxon's v i s i t t o China was araioumccd i n July 
19 71, Al l these events made India panicky and i t beyan t o secrch 
for s e c u r i t y . ThvB tfm pr ice of bet ter r e l a t i o n s cetween v-ashingtoi 
and Peking was an iB»provewent in r e l a t i o n s between Moscow and 
New Delh i . 
Suspecting wasbJ.n>dton-Fekir/j-Rav>alpindi c o l l u s i o n over the 
Bangia<te8h i s s u e Indie was forced to enter i n t o a t rea ty ac^reeinent 
with the s o v i e t union* This t rea ty narked a nev phase in Indo-
Sov ie t cooperat ion. I t dbes z^t raerely involve a comcuitment to 
peace* fr iendship and cooperation as the t i t l e axXa^est-B, bat t o a 
l i m i t e d yet s i g n i f i c a n t extent* i t i s a t reaty of m i l i t a r y 
25 
cooperat ion , i n e f f e c t i t i s a s o r t of • c r ^ p t o a i l i a n e e ' . As per 
A r t i c l e IX of t h i s Tret^ty, i n the event oi. an a t tack or threat 
the^reof # the two couoitries can not p a r t i c i p a t e i n any mi l i tary 
26 
a l l i a n c e d irected against the other party . 
Re lat ions Base^ on e q u a l i t y , nat ional i n t e r e s t and cocaron purpoeea 
As a matter of f a c t , the Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not based 
on p e r s o n a l i t i e s or ideoloc^ies but on e q u a l i t y , national i n t e r e s t 
and c»mr"on purposes. AS lon^ a s the i n t e r e s t s os the two countries 
converge t h i s s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l continue i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
the change of „ovemncnts in e i t h e r of the two c o u n t r i e s . 
24 . Robert Jackson, South Aaian C r i s i s . viRas,Nevi Delhi , 1978,p.157 
2 5 . Prakash Chandra, Inter pat ional Re la t ions , Vik^^s. tew Delhi , 
1983, p . 161 . 
26 . I b i d . , p . 162. 
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Iru ia turn c" t o x.hc Soviet jrdon t-) t i l l <5 ,ap wide*. uhE-
•J'" < tr i t s a l l i e s vere on. illirk^ to bric^^,©. Inci«V. t i l t t vvcrcls 
the Soviet Unioi ajLout vvjJLch Ux e s t .sas o-ten Ic^cly torjipl'-ii*ic 
^s ill . c t much i. or a Soviet t i l t t.^i--.rts incxa, on out 
issiK;3 vtrt t concerni_d IncA^- c-i.< \.lse t-d-'d v.:^rlc# i OSCOH sa ro^'tec 
c^ nc voted with India '^nd the t i . i rd v.orlc d t tac- J^< ant t Isev^licrt. 
On many i ssues d i r ec t l y corxf-rnir*^ the Soviet pinion, in< i« o t ten 
acs ta inec s t the U^ # somttJUncs voted au^ainst* »-nc '^ene all«^ cid 
28 
not orot fer the same kind £ -c t ive si^srwrt. 
Tti* Af>.^tenisuan issu*. dxd crea te dixterences ot opinior., 
fo r c-vcn as In<'ia unterstcoc. tt»e v;- ious consacerations i roprl l i i^ 
.'oscjw as a"s^ t,l«^ f. c t thdt tnf^  governrient in i(4u ul i.c^ d asKec" ilor 
Sovit-t a ss i s tance Incics v^ as l o t in lavour o£ - l ^ oresonoe ot 
oroitjn troops one stooc" ior a t overal l p o l i t i c a l sr tlemrnt tJ«it 
•woulf t£j3ure withcrawel of Sovi^^t troops ^.s we^l as cessa t ion ol 
interi .ercnce from across paivistan's t ron txers in tr*- Ti^r< -" 
iuaterial a ss i s tance to r e t e l elements. For Inc ia the r Liil issue 
v.t.s sc3inewhat overst>adov«ec t>y ttie v i r t u a l ir.iliwar y a l l i ance iDetween 
29 
Islamabad at^C t.ashitK^ton. 
Even thoajh Ipcxa continued to su^^cribe to the vitv. anc 
the n ' i n c i n l c tl-uAt fc»-ei*jn trOv^>s Ssiould v-ithcraw etiC e l l torts^s 
ot lore iyn interference must cease in Afghanistan, Int o-Povic t 
cooperation mul t ip l ied ir- vs^rious d i r e c t i o n s . 
28. V.F. Dutt, o n . c i t . . ^.. 134. 
29. I t i c . . p . 415, 
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Rel tiots ware a l s o strersathent d l>y the v i s i t ot Soviet 
and Incisin leaders to each o t h e r ' s coun t r i e s , s or th tnentioniny 
i n t h i s e>ciians,e are v i s i t s ol the then prenicent Sanjteva Kec<5/ 
t o the- Soviet snion in Octoiber I J B G , tlv. v i s i t o. the l<itt Soviet 
r r e s i r e n t Leonic irczivncv t:> lr,< ia ii . Deccinijc-'r 1>BC, r r s (. aiiciii's 
v i s i t t o i^oscQw in SeptewLer 1:^ 32, irteetini^ o£ the IrH o-?^oviet 
Joltx. ECDi.o i c Coffsi; i;?sion in H:jSco%* a ^evj cays e>--.rlier in 
Septemh^r 1982 and the v i s i t ot the Soviet leputy printe Mr. is ter 
Ivan ATsaiipcw in January l i i a i . 
Time minister , Hrs Indira canch i ' s v i s i t ir. tin: bet inr xr*^  
of September 19B2 was arx^tter s tep in t h i s proce<^s oC th 
development oi r e l a t ionsh ip as i t can>€ soon a f t e r Inr ic ad ruade 
various proposals a t the Jo in t Conmission jtieetiiv a te* days 
' a r l i r r , inci Uf ir . j the s e t t i i g xjp o^ -; s t e e l r U n t in Orissa, 
creat ing of ardi t ior jal cap .c i ty in the Bhilai anc Bokttro Steel 
l- ' ills anc puctitxj up . ric aluRiisia unit in Anc hra r r a c t s h . 
Brezhm?v pi* acted t u l l Soviet lielp t o Inoia tor t'urtticr fcvelopment 
of Lanic i n d u s t r i s l ike S t ee l , ronferrous meta ls , heavy 
rngineerintj anc eneryy. 
At tiie p o l i t i c a l Ic vt;I t oo , Mrs Gai.dhi anc l-.^- fcrezlmev 
underlined tr.c i.?iportance ot; Inoo-Sovict ; ritinfisnir ii . th* intt rcyt 
ot peace in Asia ano t..c '.;orld. Tlraey -c,reed ti .at tlKi' rt^-n-tii ii^ rsefl 
inoveinent should oe. stren<stht;n.-:f: ^nr ti'jat -1^* ' ^ '~»t scinie countrit-s 
v;eaKenin-:^  i t shoulr" i.e fo i l ed . They «:;lso acroed on the ur9ent 
need to restoi-e cetente ot/i trje l io i i t e t i cn of s t r a t e i c rns t o 
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eve r t a nueleer \<iZ, Krs cariChi welcotr.i d tr*. i n i t i a t i v e s *./ X-IIA. 
Soviet leaders i i . t . d s c i rec t io i i . She a l so tolcl fx t.rek,hi>,v tiv^t 
I n c i a ' s e t f o r t s to rori.saliae r e l a t i o n s i i t h Chiit. i*^ ( ,ot stucK 
on tJv to r e'er question and tti»t any infrovement V^D ilf not c« a t ' i%o 
cos t of " t r u s t ed anc time t e s t ed tri«„ncs"f >i-vicasly s.^^atir% to 
the Soviet union. This v.as on a per with Hr Brezhm v ' s own 
statement e a r l i e r t h a t nonoalization o£ Sino-Sovi^ t rel^ t io r^ would 
30 
not prejudice Moscow's t i e s with Incie , virtnam and Mon^.olia. 
Ar.,hipov# curirt. h i s v i s i t to Irt ie ir. ptciy l.;33 o. cer c tiic 
most s>phi8tict.ted technology tlx^x. tu' Soviet Jnijn l-^r, ..'n o^tt^r 
re inforced oy M-rsi«l 1 UBtin:.«v diarir^ his v i s i t in F.arch 1^34. 
TiiC Indian Finance Minister V.P. Sir/^h s t ressed cue need 
for import of hiv^h technology i n a niwix r oi. ar as in the Soviet 
Unios to ^ e w r a t e rupees wiiich coulc be u t i l i s e d b^ tlvjt country 
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t o pay zor t h e i r Imports. 
The eccotnplishBJent of I n c i a ' s 7th Five Year r l a i i s t o 
becorr.e a major s t ep in implenn^RtirK^ tht ecoionic p l i cy o; x,i£ 
goverranent of Hajiv Gandhi. One o» the object ives ot tnxs fx>licy 
i s t o secure an adequate piece ior Incia in ttie i l s t century 
arron<^ the countr ies leading in a number ot c ruc ia l i.,c us t r i e s siK:h 
as tiio-chemistry, tricroc ltctr:>niGS, petrochemistry and so on. Th^ 
vork on t h i s ^o«l presupposes the t Inc ie v»il' succcec in nk kir<a a 
3G, Tti^  Tiroes oi India , umi r e l h i , 22 Sept 1982. 
^1« l i^id. . 1 Jon IJHL, 
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t e d m o l o y i c a l breaktlTiro^^h ano i n attainiiH/ the top worie stemlarcs 
of inc j s t r i B l proc uct ion , Ttiis grantTiose task w i l l i^v^ to Le 
tack led both by the pui>lic and the pr ivate s ec tors ox the Indian 
32 
economy. 
Mr Rajiv Ganrhi pai< a seven day v i s i t t o the Soviet Union 
(May 20-26, 1985) and hnld prolonyed t a l k s with Mr Gorbachev, the 
Sov ie t p*-iine Minist«r , and other KT^nlin leaders* Ilie o lc Indo-
Sov ie t t i e s were rea firroed and a l l aspects of trie i n t r n a t i o n a l 
s i t u a t i o n reviewed i n a co d ia l atnofipbere. The two countiries 
c a l l e d £or dismantling ot a l l fore ign m i l i t a r y bases in the Indian 
ocean antS opposed the att^npts t o increase fore ign roillt.ary presence 
i n the region* 
The j o i n t cormr.imique i s sued a l t e r UR. v i s i t .xpressed 
s e r i o u s concern over che continuing tens ion i n scxne areas of 
South-Vvest-Asia. i t reaffiroied t t e conv ic t ion of the. two cotjntries 
t h a t the problems of the reg ion den&nd a peaceful p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n 
which takes cognisance of the independence, sovere ignty , t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y and non-eligned s t a t u s of the countr ies o^ the resjion. 
The reference was t o Afghanistan. 
Two agreentents were s igned bj India end the Soviet union 
i n Moscow on May 22,1985* The ayreeetient on economic cooperation 
nrovides for yreater Soviet coc^eration in key s e c t o r s of tl^' 
Indian economy liige s t e e l pmier d r i l l i n g £<^ o i l ciml cniuing. Ihe 
3 2 . The Times of l ,>cia. i^w Delhi , 7 Kov 1985. 
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second agreement perta ins t o the main d i r e c t i o n of economic 
t r a d e and s c i e n t i f i c and technical cooperation between India and 
the Soviet Union for the period upto the year 2000. The two s i d e s 
w i l l a l 8 0 consider cooperation i n construct ion of p r o j e c t s i n the 
t h i r d world c o u n t r i e s . 
The Prirae Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi addressing the Council 
of Fioreign Relat ions i n l«w York on 23 Octotoer 1931; s a i d : "India's 
c l o s e and fr i endly r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet Union l»v« developed 
on the b a s i s that t^nmy &> not require India to g ive vp i t s fore ign 
p o l i c y of non--alignEBent. They have been b u i l t on the foundations 
of mutual benef i t* mutual respect and e q u a l i t y . The Sov ie t UaJLon 
has s tood by us i n t i n e s of n&tloral c r i s i s , i t has helped us 
i n bui lding our basic i n d u s t r i e s . The trade betvreen us has worked 
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t o the advantage of both countr ies ." thei prime Minister sa id that 
Ind ia ' s r e l a t i o n s with the USSR w i l l be more f r i e n d l y . The USSR 
has been an o ld f r i end who has stood by us a t times when %«e needed 
34 
f r i e n d s . 
Rajiv Candhi*s recent v i s i t t o Moscow i n October 1985 and 
h i s t a l k s with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov* focussed on the 
disarmament i s s u e . He conn^nded the Sovie t disarmament proposals 
as the "best we have got t i l l now" and f e l t these shoulc he 
3 3 . TlW Tim^ a l lT)^^i ^^ Celhi* 24 Oct 1985. 
3 4 . The prime Minis ter , Shri Hajiv Qandhi's reply to the debate 
on the demands for grants ol the Ministry of ijcternal Affairs* 
Lok sabha. Ihe Times of India . New Delhi , 11 April 1985. 
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considered s e r i ous ly . Xn^la siyi i ta viith tlu Sovi t m^oi. < 
protocol on cooperation in tiie pt> er sector on 27 t^cembt r lySt 
a t thr close ot five day eiscussioriS, The vorkir.y pro^^rotre © ot 
cooperatitMi ijetv^cn Incia ar.r tltie Soviet i^ioL for J id -90 i s 
f ' irected towards incre«.sin9 rower generation &m' r e l i a b i l i t y . 
Tr;e procjranw>e i s to be car r ied out i^ wa^  of joi t i t executi>r. of 
power p r o j e c t s , both ti^ctnal and hydel, ar;<3 muccmisata.on ot 
ex i s t ing or^8« 
The Soviet -Jnion i s a s s i s t i i . ^ Ir.< ia i n t t e const ruct ion of 
tlie f i r s t phase of Vinchyuchel Sti^^r Thtm;al power Sta t ion in 
Me^ ahya Pradesh consist iny of s ix units of 21c rw aci., die f i r s t 
scheduled to be cwnsrisaioned i n June, 1987 and the pro^ i^ er,s a t work 
i s sa t i s f t c to ry . Soviet ass i s tance i s o l so ava i l ab le in tlK 
cons t ruc t i n o- the s<ahBl^aon SiJ|>er Tlxnaei power Sta t ion in 
Bihar cons . s t i n j o£ f ur uni t s of 210 m. each, l i e f i r s t aiiit i s 
schrdul d to be oo(.^Rji«s-orrd by Ju ly 1^90, £ollo%«d by subseaurnt 
un i t s a t s i x months in t e rva l each. 
Inco-Soviet r e l e t i o i s i*xve gtowt s t ead i ly flaring the l a s t 
tv?o <^cades, ^-.ne e. nenaed ir. tiseir ranye, ant in trseir co c i a l i t y . 
I t i s , according t o prof. RasljeeCuddin ri*in, i s "a c lassxc 
example o the best and the h i ^ l ^ s t form jt i n t e r - s t a t e relistiona 
i>asec on the p r inc ip le s of peaceful c o c ^ r a t i o n , rr.ati^lity of 
i n t e r e s t ^nd respect for each o t h e r ' s diStirjctive i d e t t i t y , anc 
35 , The TJgfes of I n r i ^ . I^w Delhi, Dec 2 7, l^uL 
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sovereign t i f f e re r i t la t ion ." 
Indo-Sovlet r e l a t ions* says P ro i . K.-eri, a re unitiue in he 
aetme that they are based on tiie conve^CjeDce ot three f ac to r s , 
ndrr»ely, enlic,ntene<3 t i loteral iSJR, mutual consnitiitent to %^orld pt^ace, 
and support to l i b e r a t i o n s t ruygles anc jus t erases of people 
everywhere* and alaove a l l , i n the \^r€la of Prof. 5l*an, ''OIA tnc 
c l e a r i<?eol<x,ical pe-r^pt ion of the Soviet s o c i a l i s t sveste ttjat 
s o l i a r i t y with an In<^oenc«nt liational Republic - tht- second most 
populous s t a t e of the v,orld - struyglini , for the c rea t ion of a 
seli ; r e l i a n t ecororoic base in t^-cler t o e radica te chronic rover ty , 
"aiapant i l l i t e r a c y , wi^spread ignorance am cripi liiit, ir.« quelit^*, 
i s UK important component ot genuine s o c i a l i s t internatxorsalism." 
So(Re major o n c l t e i o n s can be drawn f ra ; the wide ren-^e of 
Indo-SDviet Treaty of 1-/71 and the Declavstioi. anc' Ayrecww nts of 
NovetBber 1973, F i r s t l y , tr>c Soviet Union r*-8 re i t^ . ra tec more 
L irmly snc' formally i s recogni t ion of Indi^ ac a s tab le anc 
peaceful regioitAl power in South Asia which can play a pos i t ive 
r o l e in tsakiny Asia a c^ntint^nt ot peace. 
55€Condly, U« iij?partance of Inc'ia i s crucial i n Uit 
KiOveiRent of world pea<», -or peaceful s i t t letr .ent of c isputcs and 
for strenythenirig of cooperation aroon^ s t a t e s i n cefence of 
36, Rasheeduodin JQi^ n (et) , India and th<> Soviet un-ton: 
liew Delhi, 1975. 
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p o l i t i c a l cr.c ec»t<}tnic independenoe. 1hiraiy» tiio r>rirrfccy o-
Luilcini; a sel£ r e l i a n t economic base within the -:''aroevorK of a 
rtiixed econoBiy seeiiRs to iae a proposi t ion t h a t un<erlin(::3 the terms 
and provisions a t the IntSo-Soviet cooperation, 
Inceed* Indo-Sovict r e l a t i ons are an essay in the c t a t i v e 
aop l ioa t ion or the universal ly recosnised ana v.idely respected 
37 
prir*ciples of coexistence o£ s t a t e s . 
37, rasheeduddih-Khan (ed) , o p . c i t . 
i ? 
C h a p t e r - l l 
ISSUES EETvELh IM LA i^ .lsl Fhr ISVM, AM 1H. S'>Vi£T A.TXrmi. 
The E a r l y Phmae 
Ind ia and P a k i s t a n have beer, fcitter £oes ever sxnce tiicy 
a c h i e v e s t h e i r inrependetK^e i n August 194 7. The r o o t s o£ t.t*eir 
mutual antagonism l i e c3eep i n clieir i r . ter twinc^. p^ s t oat uxsstincd 
i t s modrrn c h a r a c t e r when t h e I r i t i s h aru.„unctci ttie^r xuu n t ior . 
t o %»ithc«"aw permanent ly froni South A@i«^ « T!se I n r i a n ic txoraal 
C->nyress i n s i s t c on Rseintainintj t he t e r r i t o r i c i i n t e : i t ^ oi tne 
s u b c o n t i n e n t wijere-s t r ^ Mus^i- Lc.at,ue would acce t nothxny l e s s 
t l ^ n the c e a t i o n o~ a sej^arace, SDvereif>r s t o t e . Tt*. ccUiC uti^l 
wa f a r e thv^t preceded" anr climaxed i n the t i v i a x o n of larxtish 
Ind ia hardened the animus between ln^i& anc* r>ekisiari anc 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h e p a t t e r n for t h e i r h o s t i l e r e l a t i o n s h i p , C o n t l i c t 
over f&^shroir r e i n f o r c e d deer:;ly-held t r . ^s anr susc ic l . : r J5 , i n d i s 
vas t^.rc^ivf d usirjy any ro^^ans t o des t roy r< kisvan en< br r^jincj the 
uho le of t h e subcont in . n t unc^r i t s iatninxa>n* r aKi s t an v.as 
p e r c e i v e d e x p l o i t i n g cleBva9.-s i n Ind ian s o c i e t y , hence one err., initio 
1 
t h e inc ' ian un^on. 
1 . Tawrence Zir in^j , " r i s s ^ n a n c e ano Harmony in i ^ K i s t a n i 
R e l e t i o r s " i n Surencxa Chopra, (ed) , ;«r3PfcCtivea on 
pa , . i s tan*s Fore ign Pol icy^ Guru I4anak Dev U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s , Amr i t sa r , l'^B3, p . 190, 
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javaharla l Nehru had no aaubt In h i s criind that India and 
Pakistan had t o have c l o s e r e l a t i o n s in the near future , no matter 
2 
how h o s t i l e they mi^ht Joe during a short per iod . i^ehru had 
s a i d : Their geographical p o s i t i o n being what i t i8« India anc 
Pakistan cannot help playing an important r o l e in A s i a . . . i f Incia 
and Pakistan fol low a contrary p o l i c y and are opposed t o each 
other* they w i l l obviously be neutral iz ing each other and cannot 
p lay that r o l e . . . * This c o n f l i c t and wasteful e f f o r t w i l l wipe us 
ou t from tbe face of the e a r t h . 
Pakistan's f i r s t and most (^istingoisl^c' Foreign Minister , 
S i r za fru l la Kl"»an expressed a s l a i l a r view: "rakistan and I n c i a . . . 
i ; they stood toge ther , could play i n l o r l d a f f a i r s an almost 
d e c i s i v e r o l e . . . . (but) from what might have been a p o s i t i o n of 
p o s i t i v e and construct ive beneficence for the hunan race , they 
have been pushed i n t o one that threatens the peace and prosper i ty 
of the whole of South Asia and i n i t s turn c o n s t i t u t e s a grave 
4 
menance to internat io iml s e c u r i t y . " 
The b ir th of India and Pakistan as tvio sovere ign independent 
nat ions v.as attended by unprecendented carnac/e which had a 
traumatic e f ^ c t on the minds and emotions of the tvo peop le s . 
2 . V.P. r u t t . I n g a ' s fgreiKin P9l49Yf Vikes, Delhi , 1 .84, p . 136. 
3 . S.w. Burke, Pakis tan's Foreign Po l i cy , Lonaon, 1973, p . 3 . 
4 . K. za fru l la Khan, Pakis tan's Foreign RelatiotiS, p . 8 . 
a s quoted in S.M. E^rke, JjUgigi^  
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Indians pe'-ceivec tha t Pakistan v^ as not content with emeryii«^ as 
a sovereign anc iwSepenaent natior. and the pr inci | ;a l r o t i v a t i o n 
of i t s pol icy was to I n f l i c t as much <3ainaQe on IncUa as coulo LC 
cont r ived . I t was the view of Nev; Delhx tha t wliat i^ ; t teroc. to 
Pakis tan was not how much I t gained fror; a given sittu-t ior but 
Low rouch Ir,<?la tcwt. 
Tlie l a k l s t a n i perceptiem was th- t Incia iiac not rcccmciled 
i t s e l l to the r e a l i t y of Pakistan as a sovereign independent 
na t ion , the argutiKnt prooeccd on the assumrtion tha t htiviii^ 
f a i l e d to prevent p a r t i t i o n In^^ia bcyan t o pursue a pol icy 
6 
ca lcu la ted to hur t and humiliate Pakis tan. Sinc» i t s inception 
Pak i s t an ' s paramount problerr. hess been tha t of i den t i t y a rc 
i n t e g r e t l o n . Religion provit'ed the impulse for sepa a t ion and 
fcHTnation of the s t a t e* but x^y i t s e l f could not resolve the 
problem of If e n t i t y or oi aBvelor?rnent and to keep the country 
eir:otio:ial 1/ i n t eg ra t ed . In India the s t a t e was ^ c l a r e d t o have 
no r e l i g i o n o£ i t s own and a l l r e l ig ions were to be hom>ured 
eqj&lly. In Pakistan the s t a t e i*as founded on r e l i g i o n arid 
7 
became i t s ra l son C* e t r e . 
5 . Rajendra Sareen, Pakistom The India Factor . Al l ied , 
Kew Delhi, 193'*, p . 4 . 
6 . ILid. 
7. V.P. Pu t t , Q D . d t . , pp. 133-39. 
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Th^ 196S Conf l i c t 
The short v^ ar o£ 1965 cene a f t e r a long t ens ion-r icden 
per iod s t a r t i n g frcMs the c r i s i s over the r i v a l c laims on the 
Rann o£ Kotch and eiuling with Pakistani i n f i l t r a t i o n i n t o the 
Indian part of Kashmir folloMid hy I8lBantoad*s s t r i k e in to the 
Chamb area that prompted an Indian counter - s tr ike in to west 
8 
pa kistan* 
The Sovie t leaders played the r o l e oi a mediator and 
succeeded i n persuading paKistani az»3 Indian lea^^^s t o meet i n 
a suBRDit conference to i r o n out the i r d i f f e r e n c e s , consequently 
a svsnroit conference was hosted hy the Soviet i nion a t Tashkent. 
Afteraweek's de l ibera t ions at. agrwMaent was reached known 
as the Tashkent Declaraticm on IC January 19&6. i t i s an 
honourable pact tha t of fered a ti^ odus Vivendi for working tovar<^ 
a new r e l a t i o n s h i p between India and Pakistan. For a time i t did 
c r e a t e a tK}pe for good neighbourly r e l a t i o i s u i p . Unfortunately, 
the declarati(»i proved only a short l i v e d euplvaria. It l e f t the 
9 
KaslKfir dispute i n t a c t . 
Pres ident Ayub Khar, de l ivered a v i t r i o l i c at tack on 
Hinduism which to hint was synonymous with Ind ia . He was row 
p e s s i m i s t i c abotj^ any e a r l y s o l u t i o n of the l^shmir problcKn 
because of "India's intrat^igenoe" • His conn«nts ind icated the 
8 . V.P. Dutt« o p . c i t . . p . 141. 
9 . Prai^Ash Chandra, Internat ional ReletAoniy. Vikas, aev l e l h i , 
p . 178. 
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trend o£ nev; thinking about the £ u t i l l t y # from Pakistan's point 
of vievj, of pacts l i k e the SEATO and CEKTO, Ayub Khar* sa id that 
Pakistan had Joined the 5KATC for i t s s e c u r i t y , but when i t was 
10 
a t t a c k e d , r^ne o£ the SEATO members had cotne t o i t s he lp . 
The Foreign Minister* a t the t ime. Z A . Bhi^to me g iven 
vent to a s i a i l a r outburst i n Karachi much e a r l i e r , i n an 
interv iew re leased on 5 Jane 1966 Bhuuto claimed that "Hincu 
culture" was determined to **devour* Is lamic cul ture and t h a t 
"almost a l l the i m p e r i a l i s t powers are backing India", "v.e are 
f u l l y aware ot the treacherous nature of Incia anc" we con't v.ant 
t o endanger the ex i s t ence of Pakistan i n the r^me ot cooperation", 
he s a i d and added for good measure* " i f India a^ain comma.ttec the 
mistake of chpllcngixig us* we w i l l £iv,ht a dec i c ive war lac the 
11 
sake of r ighteousness and tru^h." 
The two countr ies a l s o tradsd charges on rearming. The 
Pakistan Foreign Minister* Sharif -ud-din Firzada* accused India 
on 10 August 1966 of havincj ra i sed a reserve army of about 1*3CX),000 
men equipped with modern weapons recent ly acquirec from European 
co imtr i e s* Me a l s o a l l e g e d that Ind ia ' s e f f o r t s t o acquire nuclear 
c a p a b i l i t y had caused deep misgiv ings in view of Inc a*s refusal 
t o accept in ternat ional inspect ion of i t s atomic es tab l i shments . 
I f India did acquire nuclear weapons* t i i i s would put in Jeopardy 
the eccxiomic and p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s of a large part of mankind 
1 0 . v .P . Dutt* o p - c i t . . p . 144. 
11- i^.m^ Rf»«>r(3gy« 9- is J«iy is66. p. 7182. 
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he s a i d . 
India had i t s own conpla ints about reannlng of r ^ i i s t a n . 
In 1966 the t^fence Minister Oiaven infcamed the parllaroent that 
e v e r s inc« the Xndb-pak c o n f l i c t i n Sept«&ber 196S, Pakistan had 
been making a n out e f f o r t s to increase i t s armed s t r e n g t h , 
"Very slsseable new r a i s i n g s of a m e d personnel have been taken 
up and equipment for the Pakistan Army, Air Force and l«avy 
obtained"» Chavan s a i d . Pakistan had been rece iv ing a large 
13 
measure c^ he lp froiis China« including tanks aiu3 a i r p l a n e s . I t 
had a l s o come t o the n o t i c e of tim Indian Government tha t 
Pakis tan was trying to acquire and had rece ived U' inac?e arms and 
equipment, p a r t i c u l a r l y F«>d6 Sebre J e t F ighter s , through other 
c o u n t r i e s , Q^imn t o l d the Lok sabha on 2 A i^ i s t 1966, and 
14 
added that the US Gaveriment's a t t e n t i o n had been drawn. 
Foreign Minister Sirauran Singh to ld the Rajya sai^ha on 
9 Ai^ust 1965 that India had informed the US a u t h o r i t i e s that the 
reported resusiption o f m i l i t a r y 8u|»pll«s, such a s spare parts 
for tante and j e t a i r c r a f t t o i^k i s tan a t a time when Pakistan v^s 
adopting b e l l i ^ r e n t a t t i t u d e s against India and s t renuo i» ly 
rearming i t s e l f would only encourage that cotuatry i n i c s 
15 
"aggress ive and h o s t i l e designs a^^aic^t India .** 
1 2 . AS lap Recorder. 9-15 Ju ly 1^66, p . 7285. 
1 3 . Foreign Affairs aeoard. Aug 1966, p . 214. 
1 4 . Asian Recorder, 27 AU6 - 2 Sept 1966, p . 7254. 
1 5 . Foreiun Af fa irs Record. Aug 1966, p . 214. 
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f^kls tan appeared t o be nee t lng v i t h eome eucoess i i . i t s 
overtures t o Moscow. Gradually in the next two t o three years 
Pakistan succeeded i n engaging the Sov ie t union i n ecorjomic 
develocxnent as w e l l as in# vtrnt, appeared t o be more oninous to 
India* n i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s , even though on a rather l i m i t e d s c a l e . 
P a r t i c u l a r l y a f t er the Soviet prime Minister Mr Kosygin's v i s i t 
i n April 1966 t o Pakistan i t was reix^rted that the Sov ie t 
l e a c e r d iscussed with pres ident Ayi^ ways of lessening re l i ance 
on American and Chinese in i l i tary a i d . The Sovie t s reportedly 
16 
conveyed the i r w l l l inynes s t o supply non- le thal %«eapons. 
A nunber o£ other i s s u e s added t o the t e n s i o n s . pakJLstan's 
agreeinent wi th Chiia t o open the road bet%<een G i l v i t and Sinkiang 
was resented i n India and be l i eved t o be further evidence oi t h e i r 
17 
c o l l u s i o n . India protes ted to Pakistan as i t regarded the area 
t o be i n i l l e g a l occij|>atlon of that country and, there fore , iK>t 
18 
w i t h i n i t s coBpetenoe t o conclude such an agreement. 
The l a r g e - s c a l e i n f i l t r a t i o n froro across the border with 
ASS2UR was not a minor i r r i t a n t . Thausands of people , Hindus and 
Muslims, entered i l l e g a l l y in search of s e c u r i t y and bread and 
L a t t e r . For instance i t wc-s reported towards the end of 1967 
t h a t the Assam Po l i ce had detected about 40C0 parj.stani 
i n f i l t r a t o r s i n Assam. And, alarmingly i t was added that t h i s 
1 6 . « i e Hindustan Times. Delhi , 3 m y 1968. 
^T» P a t r i o t . Delhi , 24 Oct 1967. 
1 8 . Tribune. 2S May 1968. 
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was only 10 percent of the ec tua l nxnber o£ i n f i l t r a t i o n s . 
S t i l l another content ious i s s u e \mm the u t i l i s e t i « ( i o£ 
the %«ater of the oangrs and the Parekka Barrage being constructed 
by India* the i s sue had both p o l i t i c a l and taechnical overtones . 
Pakistan expressed s e r i o u s concern and charged t h a t the 
construct ion of the barrage t«ould leave East B. ngal dbry and 
desolate* parched of r i v e r v « t e r . India r e j e c t e d t h e charge a s 
r i d i c u l o u s and be l ievvd that there would be e f f i c i e n t water 
a v a i l a b l e t o sMtet the needs of East Benyal, on the otlr^r hand* i f 
more water was not nade a v a i l a b l e the port of Calcutta would 
s u f f o c a t e and d i e . Meetings were held a t both technica l and 
20 
p o l i t i c a l l e v e l s but only t o end i n s t a l e n a t e . 
In t h i s s i t u a t i o n of what appeared t o be unrel ieved gloom* 
t l ^ r e were two p o s i t i v e developments, one was a meeting between 
the Army Chiefs of the two c o u i ^ x i e s . A Joint communique i ssued 
a t the conclus ion of t h e i r t a l k s sa id that they had agreed to 
take s t e p s t o ensure loaintenanoe of p ^ o e f u l condi t ions in the 
21 
border areas . 
The other %#as the av.erd of the internati<xiai tribtoial on 
the t e r r i t o r i a l dispute between India and Pakistan over the Rann 
o f ?utch which had e a r l i e r nearly trii^gered we^ r JDetween the t%«o. 
1 9 . Sm<^uY ^UPftfr^* Delhi* 2e NOV 1967. 
2 0 . Ttffi tUB9Wg^§P TiHWff> Delhi* 27 }»y 1968. 
2 1 . TUB TJMt 9^ IVlQ^' De lh i . 27 Oct 1967. 
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India and Pakistan had agreed to re fer the Issue t o a tribunal* 
one Judge noirinated by India« one by Pakistan and the th ird 
j o i n t l y s e l e c t e d by the two judges who ac ted as the chairnian of 
t h e t r i b u n a l , with a dlssentlnQ judgement by Bebler* the 
tr ibunal at#arded Pakistan on 19 February 1968 about 3C0 square 
m i l e s o£ the t e r r i t o r y of the Rann of Kutch« nearly one- th ird 
of the t e r r i t o r y claimed by i t # leavins the r e s t - sane 3#200 
22 
squAre n i l e s with India« 
After a {prolonged period of t e n s i o n and lntffinslflcatl;»i of 
an anus race* Mrs Gandhi of fered on 15 August 196b a »>>war pact 
t o Pakistan i n order t o r e l i e v e the t ens ion and encourage a return 
t o the proceaa of de tente . In i t s e l f i t v,as not a novel e i^ges t l on . 
jawahariai Hehru had a l s o c^fered t h i s e a r l i e r but only to e l i c i t a 
a r e j e c t i o n from Pakistan* for i t would have nothing t o do with 
a no-war pact unless the outstandJUig I s sues were reso lved , onee 
aga in Islaoiabad's react ion was highly negat ive . The Dawn c a l l e d 
23 
i t **Indian hypocrisy*'. Marking the t h i r d anniversary o± the 
Tashkent agrttcment, India repeated the no-war pact o f f e r i n ear ly 
1969 and the Foreign Secretary iCewal Sinyh ampl i f ied to acaTirenodate 
24 
some of Islamabad's o b j e c t i o n s . 
22 . The Tines of India ^ Ifelhl, 20 Feb 1968. 
2^* The Dswn. Karachi* e d i t o r i a l « 19 Aug 1968. 
2 4 . TlfMts. 11 jan 1969. 
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Upsurge in Fast pakiatan and the EmmrQeocm of Bantu la peeh 
The tr.o8t cx i t l ca l c r i s i s in Zn&>*iPak relations came over 
the upsurge in East Pakistan and the ^sergenoe o£ Bangladesh. 
Pakistan's loss of the eastern half was lx>th a po l i t i ca l 
and an econonic blow* It v^ as not going to lead to the collapse 
ot pat.is tan but i t substantial ly altered the balaiK:e of forces. 
Pakistan vrould not eas i ly abaaten the bid for parity with India« 
and certainly the deep-seated anxmositics would not dissolve £or 
a long tine« but i t s capacity for confrontation was vxsibly 
reduced* although by no means e l in inated. India emerged as the 
stronger* the bigger ana the more powerful of the three countries 
of the subcontinent* India had leade i t clear to Pakistan that 
the prisoners of war could not be released wltht^ut the consent of 
Bangladesh and had impressed t;|3on Islanabad the urgent need to 
reeogniae the r e a l i t i e s in the subcontinent. Bangladesh had 
understandably taken the position that i t would tat. ta lk to 
pakist n about any issue without Xsiamabad's prior recognition of 
the new« independent sovereign republic. EtiiJrt^ to had to move 
cautiously so as .not to lose face and invi te trouble a t hc^ ae -
2S 
particularly from the rightwing forces l ike JameHftt-i-lslami. 
india-p.^kistan h o s t i l i t y was dampened at Simla in 1972. 
And althoi^h c«vel(^3iBent8 energiny out of that summit meeting 
betvfeen Indira Gandhi and ^ulf iqar Al i Bhutto reduced tension, 
allowed for the restc»ration of diplomatic ac t iv i ty cine promoted 
25. V.P. Dtttt, a t t j i i i * ' PP- 15£-56. 
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improved communication* the d i f ferc iKes th t continue LO divide 
New r e l h i and Islamafcad a e deep seatftd and e s s e n t i a l l y unresolvec, 
enuine cooperat i .n bet%!7een India and Pakistan i s as e l u s i v e today 
as i t vas in those c a ' l y years a f t e r inderendence. 
Inr^eed, i t v.as a stranye coincidence t h t both t h e 
a r c h i t e c t s of Siirla pact l o s t pov er i n 19 77. In July 1977 2.A. 
thutto v?a8 retr.ovtd trom power b)f a m i l i t a r y coup. He as impri-
soned and l a t e r on awarded c a p i t a l punishnitrt by CIK Sv^reme court 
of rakis ten (1978) and 8ub!?eguently executt^d i n April 1974. He 
was succeded by General 2.ia-ul-Haq the prt.sent president of 
Pakis tan . Likewise i n Xndia t o o . the government of Mrs inc ira 
Gandhi was replaced by the Janata perty headed Ly Morarji Eesai 
i n March 1977. The new leaders of both the countr ies c^eve 
assurance t o turthcr normalize r e l a t i o n s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the 
Indian Exterr^l Af fa i r s Minis ter , Atal Bih&ri Vajpayee paid a 
v i s i t t o Pakistan (February 1978) t o c l a r i f y the stand of che 
Janata regine i n Delhi , I t was a gooclvil l m i s s i o n . The two 
countr i e s agreed i n pr inc ip l e on wider ecor*:»riic r e l a t i o n s , gre. t e r 
26 
and freer exchange of c i t i z e n s and i c ^ a s . 
Tftf P9?,l iS90 phage 
Follo-iriC, the f a l l oi Janata party i n January l98o Indira 
Gandhi came back t o power o n ^ a^^ain. A sea chan j^© i n the 
in ternat iona l s i t u a t i o n had co«ne about i n the nean t i n e , A nev. 
2 6 . prawash Chandra, o p . c ^ t . . p . ItJl, 
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cole' ^m.r grippod the world* Arroaroenta pil^ d t«i<dh a^ain . Incia 
too j^aceC ne'. and ha 'sher challeuLst-S i n foreis^n po l icy , touch 
K.,re ser ious then ever before, r^velopments with rec^c. 6 t o 
Afytanlstan* Fakistar*, the Gulf anr Kest Asia, threw cwninous anc 
e i r . i s t e r st^dows over peac^ and secu r i t y ot India . 
India vjas up av^ainss. an even more formidable problem: the 
Lrenxied rearmaiaent of Pakistan* Both ^ashinr-^ton and lsl*itoubec 
were se t t o make the ntaximuBi o£ t h i s s i t ac t ion , r r e s i cen t 
Car ter ^cve the ^^reen Si-^n^il and ne^aOti^tiDns beycn p a r t i c u l a r l y 
with ^Irm v i s i t of Erezir^ky in Janusry I98c, i.nai»a-Pe i s t a n 
r e l a t i o n s a a i n acquir*, d a Bixaiare diaiei^ion and some r evel^jprocnts 
were socn^t.hot b i z a r r e , According, t o prof . V.r • Dutt in luss 
than two y^  a> s 2,i« \i&c c:di^ied h i s mind and paKistan s t r essed the 
need for a no-%«ar pact* while an impression went aroune tha t 
27 
m e i a was di ther ing and foot-dragging. 
i n Ju ly 1980, Agha shahi* the Fcnreiyn Minist<='r of poi i s t a n , 
paid a v i s i t t o SCJW Ee lh i . He asked for a " ju s t and atr.icable 
8e t t l«Rent of the dispi^e over J&wmvt and Kashmir" . iie prc^josed 
the deterrnination ot a r a t i o i n the ariBec forces of t.he two 
c o u n t r i e s . And he suy^ested thstt ti^B a cqu i s i t i on ot sophis t i ca ted 
vteepons lay In^ia ^as causing concern amvoOQ a l l neighbours of 
23 
I r<3ia . 
27. V,P. Dutt, o p . c i t . . p . 370. 
20. i^si&n R#>cor<^r« 12-ia Aug 198Q. p . 1LS9S. 
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Although AQha shahl t^ok pains t o so f t en the impact of h i s 
speech , there uas not much progress on the subetAntive Is^sues. 
However, the dialogue was t o continue as the j o i n t stat«T>ent i s sued 
29 
by the tvo Foreign Ministers on 17 July 1980 aff irmed. 
Foreign Minister Kaiasinha Rao v i s i t e d Islamabad i n Jane 
1981. His miss ion was to probe Pakis tan's pro te s ta t ions 02: peace 
and to bui ld coni ic^nce . He s a i d , "at l e a s t India should be 
c r e d i t e d vdth the persp i cac i ty t o Know that there Wr s n t a s i n y l e 
problem of hers thejt could be so lved b,. the uncoing of ra istc-n." 
He spoke for free exchanc^e i n the economic t i e l c and greater 
academic exchanges anti c r o s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n of idteas for promoting 
30 
mutual understanding* 
In September 1981 Pakistan and the united s t a t e s formalized 
agreement on a us $32 b i l l i o n mi l i tary and eccmomic a s s i s t a n c e 
proi^amne over the next f i v e years . The pr ize catch was the U'^  
cexnmitment t o s e l l 40 F«>16 planes on a cash b a s i s of $1 .1 b i l l i o n , 
7 of than before October 1932, tha t were not included in the 
31 
a s s i s t a n c e package. 
The US o f f i c i a l statement e a r l i e r on arms aid t o rakiscan 
had s a i d tha t wasliington proposed t o g i v e arms t o Pakistan t o 
enable i t to withstand the growing threat of "Soviet expansion" . 
I t was made c l ear that the US v»nt<.d t o help Pakistan aga ins t a 
2 9 . Asian Recorder. 12- ld Aug 1980, p . 1&59&. 
3 0 . The Infiian Exnreas. New Delhi , 12 June 1981. 
3 1 . The Times of India . Lev. Delhi , 17 Sei^ 1981. 
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p o s s i b l e Sov ie t a t t a c k tram Afghanis tan . I t %^ulci L a r c r o p r l a t e 
a t t h i s stag© t o sum «4> the o b j e c t i o n s t h a t India ht^d t o t h i s 
rearming oC Pak i s t an end t h e t o t a l i t y of the- s i t u a t i o n i'acinta 
32 
In(31a. 
This r e l a t i o n s h i p t h r e a t e n e d Ind ia a s niMh as the p r e s e i ^ e 
o Sov i e t t roops i n Afytjanistan t h r e a t e n e d paKxst n- There v/as 
f u r t h e r t h e f e a r t h a t a US-pakistan-Cfii»» combinat ion could 
s e r i o u s l y ui«3ennine Inc i an i n t e r e s t s i n South ano South- . . es t Asia 
and t u e l t h e nei co ld v^ar* l t » tyj«s oi weapons heln^ roaae over t o 
P a k i s t a n vrere such a s t o encouraye ano the r arms r a c e Jaetvjeen t h e 
two c o u n t r i e s . The l a t e s t convent iona l v.«a~onry v^as o r the l i s t 
f o r shipment t> P a k i s t a n , i - 1 6 p lanes* M-IJ tanhs «nc iiarpoon 
roissilfs, e t c . I ne i a teiiev. d t h a t i f i t took no coun te rva i l i i i y 
«?teps, p- ( . i s tan*s a r s e n a l wauld be a g e n e r e t i o n ahead . This 
--rcHnpted I n d i a t o :=>KOJJ lot French Mirages and B r i t i s h j a u y u a r , 
end so on . The conseauence uae ano the r expensive arms r cce between 
33 
.he two c o u n t r i e s . 
I t was 8c»iev.hat i r o n i c th&t w i t h i n a rn„nth of th f ci^resnent 
f o r ne: amus bt^tv^cen U'A v.n€ pc^kistan, t h e r e v&c « sudden tiian^e 
of view i n Islainaba< and Generel 2ia o f f e r ed t o 8lc,n a Wo-war r c c t 
w i t h I n c i a . FaKlst?in r o r e i ^ n Min i s t e r* Agia Shan i , v i s i u . d t^v. 
Delhi i n J6nufc»ry li*32. In h r roeetiny wi th h^ii& Shahi on it, J a n u a r y . 
Mrs G ndlii o f i e r e d t o s i j n a t r e a t y of peece anf r r l c n d s h i p wi th 
3 2 . The Times of i^f^to. I^w Dt^lhi. 11 J u l y 1981. 
3 3 . V.P. Du t t , o o . c i t * . p . 382. 
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Pakistan as a mocm p o s l t i v * s t e p than a eoere No-war pact . 
whether i t %rould be a No-v>ar pact or a fr iendship treaty* 
the real i s s u e vras a fundanental divergence on what 8)%>uld 
c o n s t i t u t e the bas i c elcraents o£ such an a c o r d . In lnc ia*s 
percept ion any such agrecsnen^ to have meaning and relevance 
nuet include an o b l i g a t i o n by the tvio cous&riia not t o g ive bases 
and VDt t o became part of the s t r a t e g i c cc^u^nsus of any fcnrelgn 
power. Pakistan was unwilling t o accept any such condit ion and 
put forward thf view that althotigh i t was non-al igned i t would 
not c'ilute i t s sovereign r ight t o decide such i s s u e s . India a l s o 
wanted ttue tt<o countries t o keep t o b i l a t era l i sm i n resolv ing 
:utstanc=ing issxjtem, but Pakistan ^ould not £:»resvear i t s opt ion 
t o take any c i spute t o in ternat ional forons . General 2ia had 
35 
made patent h i s view th^ t Kashroir was an internat ional i s s u e . 
In Escember 1982 the Foreign Secretar ies of the two 
countr i e s reached an agreement i n New Delho. that a m i n i s t e r i a l 
l e v e l Jo in t Commission would be s e t i;^ t o strenythen the 
understanding between the two countries for promoting mutual 
cooperaticm. The areas s p e c i f i e d for cooperation v«M.thin the ambit 
of the Joint. Commissimi were econony* trade* inr ustry, education* 
health* culture* consular matters* tourism* travel* in-ormation* 
and sc i ence and techxudl^y. The Commission would le chaired 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y by the Foreign Ministers of Int'ia and Pakistan. The 
Commission could further e s t a b l i s h sub-commissions on these 
3 4 . The Times of India , Kew Delhi* 31 j a n 1982, 
3 5 . ^b id . . 7 May 1982 
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s p e c l £ i « d ar«a8. The agrecnent was f o m a l l y s igned duriny 
General ^ i a ' s v i s i t to Incia for the Seventh Ncm-alit^ned Summit 
«nd the Oxntnission cAum t o l i f e i n March 1983. 
priBte Minister Rajiv Ganohi indicated that measures other 
than a weapons programme would be taken t o meet the s i t u a t i o n 
37 
a r i s i n g frosi Pakistan's nuclear e f f o r t now a t an advanced s t a g e . 
Rajiv Gandhi had t a l k s with p r e s i A n t z ia during h i s v i s i t t o 
New York in October 1985. India proposed t o plead with Pakistan 
t o abandon i t s nuclear weapons programme—-the main hurdle i n the 
way o£ nonaal i sat ion of r e l a t i o n s between the two cxiuntries. 
Talking t o newsaen on the eve o£ h i s fneetiag with the Pakistan 
president* Gen. z ia-ul -Haq, Mr <?l)ndhi sa id Islamabad's niK:lear 
tfeapons proyramne was **our main concern". But he sa id he was 
a l s o keen to improve r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan i n every f i e l d , 
38 
including trade commerce and c u l t u r e . 
The Prime Minister was quoted as s a y i i ^ that h i s meeting 
with pres ident Zia-al-Haq had "very d e f i n i t e l y * produced r e s u l t s . 
i n an Interview t o the Kew York Times« Mr Garu^i sa id he anc the 
Pakistan pres ident had agreed to begin ta lks on sccu. i t y an the ir 
39 
bor(^rs and increase economic cocqperation. According t o the 
Pakistan Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the Qanchi-zia 
40 
meeting was cordia l and s u b s t a n t i a l . 
3 6 . The Hindustan Tinr^es, Kew IDelhi, 24 Dec 1982. 
3 7 . T?lt limf of I n c i a . Delhi , 11 Oct 198&. 
3 8 . I b i d . . 23 Oct 1985. 
3 9 . :^X^» 24 Oct 1985. 
4 0 . I b i d . 
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v^nile paKi.si.ani spokeoswn trequent l^ laonched verbal a t t a c , 
on Zncia a t in te rna t iona l ^orians* the iorel^n Kj-nist r s oi tim 
two countr ies a<aree<3 a t the UN headquarters on Octolx^r 3 , i>a5 
on the need to expand the areas ot cooperat ion. F^v<evrr# the 
agreen«nt %'.as only in p r i n c i p l e . Mr BQli Rsro Bt^iQat, lr»ria»s 
nev rx te rna l Affairs Minister and h is mki scan i counterpart 
41 
?ah'^bzadayaqub fOian, discussed bil&teral ma t t e r s . 
A fxve-point o i t e r on both coiaatries ci^^reeirig to s ign the 
i n t e rna t i ona l nviclecir ron-pro l i fe ra t ion t r e a t y , accepting : .al l 
scjpe in te rna t iona l safeK^uards and inspect ion of e a ^ o t h e r ' s 
nuclear f a c i l i t i e s , *«a put Icwward by panistai. a t the ih. i t 
a l s o included «fcking South Asia a nuclear-free zone. Bui Inaia 
has re jec ted the oc fe r . Rajiv Gandhi expressed trie ttope t h a t tne 
coin^r^ t£ lks between him cine ^ia—ul-i^q %«Duld leao to a wider 
understandiiic, uetw<„en tijc t%»o coun t r i e s . Hr Gat.mi tolc newsKnen 
a t the conclusiw»Q of uis three-cay v i s i t to the iya>,jBhacv.eep 
i s l and tha t Pakistan wants a vo^-mmr p ac t . But Incia coes txit 
i.ant t o l i ^ i t the un^rstandifig t o snly th. t . i t wants extension 
42 
t o a broader anc consol idat d agreement. 
on the proposal 4.or a no-war pact anc* p* ace t r e a t y , Gci*. 
Zia saif' the Foreign Secre ta r ies o^ : the two countr ies would met t 
i n Islaip^tbed in t t e t h i r d week of Janu^^ry 1986 t o resume the i r 
4 1 . Th^ yiiaes o£ I n r i a . t e l h i , 4 Oct 19aj>. 
4 2 . For fur ther d e t a i l s see The Tintes ot Ind ia , Delhi, ^4 nov l*5»8b, 
' i 4 
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at tempts t o roer e tlK. two ara£ta» Gen. kii^ ^as asKtc vhct l^r 
the re vas SCRHS proi^ress on the Kashmir icr ue a i r e . :i4. r e i c 
Pakistan wisoed to solve tr® Koshrnir cisputc uric er tite Simla 
ac^reeipent. "'c have decided to iirprovc- our r e lo t ionsh ip xn 
areas of &--^reemcn%. one r.ot ac'd to areas of disayreewer.t". ?,ashiair 
44 
"vsil 1 come ^) a t o l a t e r t in^* he- sal t? , pres ident 2 i a ' s tarief 
stopover in Delhi on receai> r 16, 19oL rias i»eri a remarKeble 
success tooth for nim anc? r-rlroe Minister Rajiv Ganfhl. E ch one 
o' thein has been tryinc, to demonstrate t h a t he i s deeply intere«3tef 
in es tab l i sh ing tension-free r e l a t i ons in the sub-cant inei . t . 
fioth have successf u's 1^ used the meeting in t e l h i lOr such a 
45 
6croons t ra t i o n . 
Pakistan call^ K for a b i l a t e r a l t r e a t y with ipcia \mich 
v i l l r e i n i - r c » the p r i n c i - l e s of noi.-avaffression anc non-use c;£ 
fo rce . Pakistan Foreign Minister Sehabzada Yaqub K .an, .n a 
so-minute foreign policy stat^^sent t o a j o i n t sessloii oi parliament 
s a i c tha t pa<vist,an*s re la t loi iship with Inc la ^^ nr" tht sit.ik-ti„n 
i n Afgirianistan %*ere thet most important foreign pol icy issues £or 
46 
Isl^ioabad* 
The union Finsr^e Minister Mr V.P. Sin.,h hint c a t the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o a Ion:; term t rade egreentent betv.eer Inc'ia anf"; 
*3» T>^ Tiroes of India , Pel h i , 17 Pec VJ3b, 
44. Ib id . 
* - • Ibic . , 1S< Dec 198i). 
46 . For fu r t J^ r d e t a i l s see The yiroes ol Ipc ia , Kev. pe'lhi,25 Pec <i5. 
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Pakistan* t o be signed* hopeful ly durir^ v* the prime Minister 
47 
Mr Rajiv Gandhi's v i s i t t o Islamabad during 1986. The tvo 
countr i e s agreed that t o encourage greater contact between the 
i n d u s t r i a l and trading communities of the tvo countries« exchange 
of de legat ions of businesmien* i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and p r o f e s s i o n a l s 
48 
should be organised. 
The current s e r i e s of contacts betvreen prinne Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi and president Zia-ul-Hs^q* wri tes Narendra Singh in 
the Sunday Review* are taking place "at a time when the s k i e s are 
darkening as a r e s u l t of Pakistan's c landest ine e f f o r t s t o bui ld 
a nuclear bomb. The united States alone i s in a p o s i t i o n t o apply 
the brakes on Pakistan's s u i c i d a l quest . But i t i s confused and 
has been act ing ambiguously. And in the meantime, pres ident 2 ia 
i s fttrging ahead* cunningly using a l l the a v a i l a b l e wind, what 
are the factors helping him? How can a government so dependent 
on fore ign ass i s tance* g e t away with i t a l l ? " There are four 
reasons , says Narendta Singh* why the Pakistan Ixxah programme i s 
making hea&ri»y, besides* of course* the a s s i s t a n c e i n material and 
technology that the Chinese people ' s Republic may be furnishings 
" The Afghanistan s i t u a t i o n * whi(^ puts Pakistan in a 
strong bargaining p o s i t i o n with the US; 
- American ambiguity as t o whether they should act 
uniquely to s top Pakistan or a l s o rope in i:^dia t o 
accept safeguards together with Pakistan; 
4 7. The Times of India . K«w Delhi* 11 Jan 1986. 
4 3 . For further d e t a i l s of Indo-pak Trade Protocol see The 
Tinea of I . ,dia. X3slhi* 8*9*10 and 11 Jan 1986. 
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- Z id ' s success i n presenting the Pakistan nuclecr 
P'O j^ramrae as an Zn<3o<-pak i s s u s i n the JSA; and 
49 
- Ind ia ' s confusedness* 
Tlte Afghanis van v^r i s by l a r the most isiportant £actor 
helping Zla . Pakistan «PBbarkec vpon a nuclear vreapons proyrantme 
un<i^r fihutto# a f t e r i t s defeat i n the Bangladesh var . The 
Chasms plant was b u i l t t o ex trac t plutonium froro spent f u e l . The 
French helped i n t h i s * Later the Kahuta i n s t a l l a t i o n was 
s tar ted* t o enr ich uraniun to a high degree. Bhutto presented 
t h e s e ventures as an Islamic e f f o r t t o L i b ^ , Saudi Arabia and 
Iran t o get noney frs^n them. There were !»:> f a c i l i t i e s i n 
Pakistan t o use e i t h e r plutoniutn or highly enriched uranium tor 
peaceful purposes, ihat the programme was t o acquire nuclear 
50 
weapons* vas obvioiMi fron the very s t a r t . In 1977 the US cut off 
a l l a i d t o Pakistan t o put pressure on i t t : aban&>n i t s bomb 
progranme. And then i n 1981« US a id t o pekis ten vas resumed o n ^ 
51 
more and in a much* mtKh bicger way. 
Hopes ««re r a i s e d a f t e r the Reagan-Gorbachav summit i n 
Geneva in Octover 19d5 during which the Afgrianistan i s sue %«as 
d i s c l o s e d . Subsequently a l e t t e r was addressee by the us to the 
UK Secretary General expressing wi l l ingness to c^uBrantee the 
s topping of a i d t o the rebe l s* i f the Soviets agreed t o withdraw 
4 9 . Marendra sijagh* Suyic^ v peyl^iw* The Times of Xnci&i 
5 jan 1986. 
^ 1 - Ifaidp 
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by a fixf d d a t e . But pro^rcaB eluded the ui: mediators a t the 
l^.st meeting« held between iDecember 16-19* 1935 in Geneva. The 
•jr'?P feels t ha t the flow -.f arms t o the re^^els rray be herder 
t o verxLji than ^ht vithci-awal of t t ^ i r fcarces ar«5 remcins susr -c lous 
of the proposed v^u^rantees. But wl»ethe.r the Soviets have 
d e f i n i t e l y decided t o withdraw t h e i r forces ar^ d a t e t r u l y searching 
to r adequate guarantees* refrains in auui4;. 
/aaerican ambiguity towards Pak i s tan ' s nuclear proyr^unme* 
however* goes f w t h t r than t h e i r (tependeiKse on Pakis tan ' s because 
of Afghanistan. iMxordiKj to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, 
p res ident Reayan t o ld liin in New York i n October 1935 t o enc^age 
**quickly" in b i l a t e r a l discussions with president Zia to avoid 
a nuclear race in the subcontinent "before a point of no r e tu rn 
^aa reached." This i r - l i e s , varites Karero3ra Singh tliat the US 
Presideitt: sees a conr^ction between Pakis tan ' s race towards the 
fiOEBb and I n d i a ' s nucl< ar programme, imp l i c i t l y blaroiiKj India for 
\.hat Pakistan i s doing* Tlie aame theme ol an India-Pakistan 
accord, i n which both would accept the safeguards o^  the NPT regime, 
as the best vay to s t c ^ Pakis tan, was propoimded by the US <^puty 
unc5er-secretary of St^'te, t^.r Armscot in Delhi i n September iv85 — 
olthoo-jh i n Islasiabad he ta lked firmly to president z ia a^cins t 
the bomb. Pakis tani diplomacy i.ciS cons is ten t ly btren t ry ing t o 
^ iyh t US pressure e.^ainst i t s nuclear proL,rorr.Rie, by making tht^ 
whole t.Linj out t o be in an Incia-pakis tcn i s sue . r^Kistan was 
quick t o r e a l i s e t h ^ t there would ije l i t t l e s^ropathy for a Pakistan 
nuclear proc,rar':roe t o which safeguards v;er» r^ot a t tached; but 
4 3 
considerable s^iopathy for ftnd d l scr ln lnatory treatment ot the 
52 
Pakistan nuclear programtoe* v i s - a - v i s t h a t of "neutral" I n c l a . 
"The accord aivxounced a f t er the India-pakisten Siannit of 
December 17,1985 must have a^^ieared t o z ia as a wonderful christmos 
p r e s e n t . The crux of the agreement i s theit the two s i d e s l>ave 
ac,reed not t o bomb each o t h e r ' s nuclear ins ta l la t io : -S i n the 
contex t of abjuring the use of force aga ins t each o ther . India 
can not press pa i s t a n t o a c ^ p t safeguards of the NPT regime 
53 
because India i t s e l f i s ^ p o s e d t o ther.< and with good reason." 
Amongst India 's immediate neighbours. Pakistan h&s so far 
projected an a l t o g e t h e r d i f f erent type of relatic»nship. For 
Viistorical reasons , t o be t r a ^ d t o i t s v ry o r i g i n s , Pakistan 
has over the years developed the stance of an adversary; on t i p 
of that hss came Pakistan's membrship of the m i l i t a r y c i l l iance 
b l o c s end mw the stratec^ic consensus s e t up by the u?/.. Vv'ith 
four w a s i n thr e ceca<es# Indo-pak acrim ny has so :^ ar posed the 
b i g g e s t ct^llenb® t.o the country's secm-i ty and h£*8 g r e a t l y 
conc^itioned i t s fore ign pol icy* 
The future of Ii^o-psK r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i e r g e l y i:ounc up 
v,ith Pakistan's roiliiary l i n k s with super power p o l i t i c s . By 
i t s e l . . Pakistan i s not a major s e c u r i t y thr< a t t o Ino ia . iiowever# 
pakistut^ itas l i n k s that could c<»astitute a ser ious dan^jer. 
5 2 . I b i d . 
5 3 . I b i d . 
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N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s o: ttm utmost in)portance# as wi th r^th' r 
ne ig l ibours , t i i a t every e f f o r t should be made t o inaintaxn p ^ a ^ i u l 
atie, i f p c ^ s l b l e ^ r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with P a k i s t a n , jboth on an 
iiRRjediate and l o i ^ - t e n s b a s i s . I nd ia mxiBt seek t o irrp ove i t s 
r e l a t i o n s on a r e a l i s t i c r a t h e r than s e n t i m e n t a l b a s i s . The 
i d e a of a J o i n t Comtr.issiDn and Trecity of F r i endsh io a r e moves ir. 
"b4 
t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n and shou ld be pursued p a t i e n t l y . 
BBYjir^ fflRfPPif> P» 1 3 1 . 
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PAK S^QVIET RLLATIQMS AKE I HE IKTIA FACTOR 
u n t i l 1962« ideology was an iaportant elenient i n Pakistan 
fore ign pol icy* and tra iwlated i n t o prac t i ce i t n^ant pref«rcnc« 
for the tiestecTi countr ies and d i s l i k e o£ cantcunisn. 
The nev p o l i c y won India ' s fr iendship r e a d i l y because i t 
professed t o toe neutral i n the East^v^ist cold war and had worked 
£or good r e l a t i o n s with the ccnnunist countr ies from the cut se t 
of independence, with Pakistan i t was n:)t so e&sy t o e f f e c t a 
clvftnge. Added t o the i d e o l o g i c a l barrier was the d i t f i c u l t y that 
i t ted been palpably pro-Vvest i n her fore ign p o l i c y , and i n 191A 
had openly subscribed t o the western sys t en of defence a l l i a n c e s . 
I t was not t i l l Pakis tan's a l l i a n c e with the west had cooled off 
i n the %#ake of the l a t t e r * s anas a id t o India in 1962, chat the 
r e q u i s i t e c l imate for a rea l icDprowment i n Pakistan's r e l a t i o n s 
1 
w i th the oommunist world was created* 
A svBTvey o£ pakistc^ni opinion a f t e r independence w i l l 
v i v i d l y i l l u s t r a t e how s e r i o u s l y Pakis tanis viewed the three t 
from caromunisn to the ir s p i r i t u a l and physical ex i s t ence and w i l l 
r e f u t e the not ion that Pakistan tr i cked a g u l l i b l e Aiaerica but i n 
r e a l i t y for use s o l e l y aga ins t India , on 12 Arci l 19&0 prijoe 
1 . S.M. Burke, Pakistan's goreion Policy^ Oxford Universi ty 
p r e s s , i,ond<^, 1973, p . 9 1 . 
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minis te r Lierruet Al i l-rjan proposed that the Ur^ited Stc tes should. 
<^  ncourage the idea ot t e r r i t o r i a l jUBrantees to Incia anc 
r ak i s ton t o o l lov the«B to spend m^re .n econoisic itrprovement/ 
2 
"which vssuld kr^ep out the potenticil menace of coratnurdsin." 
MOSCOW.*s image of rakis tan was more unfavourablt i n 
comparison to i n e i a , Pak is tan ' s bi<? t o assume 1 a<fership oi 
ran-ls lsrnic Icarces prov^ <" a atumb'ing bloc for the impr . ein< nt 
o£ rel^ t i ons v.ith the sovie t union. Moscow condemnec" the convening 
of the f i r s t Islamic £coiK>fnic Coricerence in i-arachi. The crovlng 
pro-ves t o r i en t a t i on of lakis ta t . a l so roaee the Russians s j s r i c i c u s , 
ana there v.er« adverse cc^rnents in x.im sovie t p r e s s . lya^ov 
VwTote th t p^kisLcn ^ss beir.y converted in to a • 'Bri t ish bricgeheaa 
i n the Lest7 in to a "stconc Tr ^ns-Jorcan of er^rtci^us ciraensions**, 
by ellov.ir.y the continuption ot lar i t ish m i l i u r y Ibises iu uts 
3 
t e r r i t o r y under the react ionary ru l ing c i r c l e s . V.V. Balabushevxch 
suspected a secre t ^v,rc©GJent ot r^kis tan with cne lari t ish for 
w i l i t a r y bases anC speculated about the united States negotiat ing 
4 
t o r s imi la r f a c i l i t i e s in the K. Fr and else^vhere. v i s i t s by ; lie 
^^.Biericrns to i^kistan* r e r t i c u l a r l y to t*r no-thoru a r . c s close 
t o the f ron t i e r of the Soviets , and r^-kistan's a t t i t u ^ tov^rds 
Korean war a l so casse in for severe c r i t i c i sm xi. the &>viet pre^ss. 
I t s support tor tVtt^  us-sporisorec reso lu t ion on Korea in t^ *e or 
2 . i^v. HtpcL T^Aiaes. 13 April 1950 quoted i n n.K. Burk . o p . c i t . 
3 . Key/ Times, ^ o . 3, 14 j an 1^43, p . b, 
4 . I b i d . , '^l NOV 1948. 
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General Mism^bly and the suppl i e s and eqjdLpcek.nt rushed by I t t o 
t h e a s s i s t a n c e ot tlui UK farces i n Korea v«re described as the 
5 
"serv i ce zeal** o£ Liacfust A l l Khan. 
The f i r s t la s^ve to e s t a b l i s h diplomatic r e l a t i o n s bet%feen 
Pakistan and Russia was not made t i l l 13 April 1943, on xhich 
date Foreign Minister zafarul lah Khan in Hew York proposed t o 
Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko t l » t t h e i r countr ies 
exchange ambassaaors* It %<as be l ieved that Pakistan took the 
i n i t i a t i v e in improving r e l a t i o n s with the USSR t o o f f s e t the s h i f t * 
then under way* of the Vtestern coimtries towards Inclia on the 
K^stanir ques t ion . Bat the Pakistani move ran out of s tean because 
thouyh the Sov ie t agre^nent t o e s t a b l i s h diplomatic relauicms %«a8 
announced within a month* i t vas lust t i l l another seventeen months 
had passed that pc^kistan named i t s f i r s t Anbassacor t o the USSR. 
The nominee fir^ally presented h i s c r e d e n t i a l s i n Moscow on the 
l a s t c^y of 1949/ the counterpart fr«n Ri»s ia took even longer 
t o show xjp i n Pakistan and assumed charv^ e^ of h i s o f f i c e on 
22 March 19&0. 
Even before i t entered i n t o diplomatic r e l a t i o n s * the 
s o v i e t union had e s tab l i shed f a i r l y good trading r e l a t i o n s with 
Pakis tan. During 1948-49* for instance* the Soviet Union exoorted 
b. Key Times. No. 28. 12 July 1950* pp. 19-20 . 
6 . S.M. Burke* o p . c i t . . pp . 98 -99 . 
S3 
about 120,000 tons of food grains t o Pakistan and ln>p<»:ted raw 
7 
co t ton in return. The trade turnover between the tvfo countr ies 
exceeded to. 71 m i l l i o n . Pakistan enjoyed a favourable balance of 
8 
trade amounting t o about Ss* 17 .2 m i l l i o n . 
To negot iate a trade agreement a Sovie t de legat ion arrived 
i n Karachi in July 1949. Commercial and p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s in 
Pakistan showed considerable enthusiasm and i n t e r e s t in the 
m i s s i o n . The Pakistani press forcas t t h a t the sphere o£ S o v i e t -
Pakistani trade could be considerably enlarged. The Dawn wrote 
t h a t the consensus of opinion in comeercial c i r c l e s was that the 
general condit ions promised f r u i t f u l trade r e l a t i o n s between the 
9 
two c o u n t r i e s . 
Pakistan's a l l i a n c e with the West in 1914 a f f ec t ed the trade 
relatJ-ors between the two c o u n t r i e s . There wes consequently no 
10 
new trade agreement t i l l 1956. 
In the meantime Soviet criticimtn of pakist<. nl p o l i c i e s 
picked up again* and increased i n i n t e n s i t y a f t er Liaquat Al l Khan 
had yiven express ion t o f r i end ly sentiments towards h i s American 
h o s t s during h i s tour of t h e i r ^ u n t r y in the fol lowing spr ing , 
on the eve of the International Is lamic Economic Conference at 
Karachi« the ^ w T i ^ s observed that the purpose of the Conference 
was t o prepare the ground for an a n t i - s o v i e t Muslim Mil i tary and 
f' 3S&JSix&* 19 Jttiy i y*9 . 
8 . ip^^, 
9« JMiI«.« 17 Sept 1952. 
1 0 . Ragunath Ram, Soviet Po l i cy Towards Pakistan. New Delhi.1983, 
p . 168. 
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11 
p o l i t i c a l b l o c . Conmentins, oa Liaquat*8 v i s i t t o USA* the sane 
p e r i o c i c a l tnrotc t h a t "the vqpshot o£ his v i s i t miyht iie 
uiwistakably yuessed £roa the * serv i l e seal* wi th which he 
hastened t o proclaim h is s o l i d a r i t y v i t h the ugly deeds ot 
12 
Mwrican inperial ima i n Korea.** 
The Pakis tani prlae Minister appeared w i l l i n g t o Journey 
t o Moscow a f t e r h i s t r i p t o the USA, but the Sovie t iJnion on the 
one i^Bnd assuaed a sph inx- l ike s i l e n c e about the v i s i t and on 
t h e other becesme increas ing ly acxiinonious about Pakis tan's 
a l l e g e d a n t i - S o v i e t moves i n partnership with ' l i sper ia i i s t* 
B r i t a i n and Aser ica . Liaquat A l i Khan's intended t r i p t o Moscow 
13 
thus simply faded away i n course of t ime . 
prime minis ter Liaquat A l i lOian did not go t o Moscow but 
went ins tead to the USA. I t was r i y h t l y interpreted by most 
Pakis tani coaraentators to mean that he had openly chosen 
f r i endsh ip with the united S ta te s i n preference t o c o r d i a l i t y with 
the I.SSR. Analysing the reasons why he went t o the usA and not 
t o the Sovie t union* a study gro^p o£ the Pakistan i n s t i t u t e of 
I i ^ e r n a t i « » l Affa irs vrotet "there are Is^ortant diver^^ence of 
out look bet i»en Pakistan* v^ith i t s Is lemic background, and the 
S o v i e t union Kxth i t s background of Marxism which i s a t h e i s t i c . . . 
Pakistan had not i ced the subservience which was farced upon the 
1 1 . See S.M. Burke, o p . c i t . . p . i c o . 
12. Mew Times, No. 28 of 19&0 in S.M. Burke, op.cit.. p. ICO. 
13. S.H. Burke, op.cit. 
&5 
a l l i e s of the Sovie t Union • • • • Furthermore* ther« was t t e quest ion 
whether Russia couXd supply the aid* both roaterial and technica l* 
14 
w h i ^ Pakistan so urgently nacdea." Explaining Liaq^^t A l l ' s 
d e c i s i o n t o go t o Washington ins tead of Moscow* a Pakistani writer 
says thiit Liaquat A l i r e a l i z e d Pakistan's dependence upon the united 
S t a t e s for economic a s s i s t a n c e as ear ly 1949-&0. Acccurding t o 
K. Sarwar Hasan* "I t was t ^ r e a l i s a t i o n of econonic dependence 
upon the u*S. that prompted Liaquat A l i t o postpone i n e f f e c t t o 
abandon* h i s projected v i s i t t o the s o v i e t union and go t o the 
un i ted States instead". 
State Depftrtinent o f f i c i a l s described h i s v i s i t as a "great 
success anc the press and Radio have been struck by h i s charm* 
g e n i a l i t y and frankness." Others sa id tha t "Liaquat A l i Khan and 
h i s wife had came* seen* and conauered" ttte c a p i t a l of the United 
15 
S ta ted . 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o note tha t though the er.liyhtened s e l f 
in t eres t" of Pakistan d ic ta ted i t s prime Minister t o prefer the 
uni ted States to the Soviet Union a t a c r i t i c a l Juncture of i t s 
h i s tory* Liaquat A l i Kmn repeatedly s t a t e d that he would ava i l 
h i n s e l f of the f i r s t opp(»rtunity t o v i s i t Moscovi and made i t q u i t e 
e x p l i c i t that Pakistan s tood t o gain from the Soviet experience and 
a s s i s t a n c e in the f i e l d of a g r i c u l t u r e . To a quest ion put t o him 
a t press Gonference a t Houston whether he anti-cipeted "any tboi^^ble 
16 
from Russia"# he r e p l i e d i n the negat ive" . This d e a r l y showed 
1 4 . paHJi^ i^Bf HflFAlgPi March 1956. 
1 5 . Tin Hlnftli Madras* 12 May 1950. 
16« I b i d . . 23 May 1950. 
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t h a t Pakistan v.as careful not t o a l i e n a t e the Sov ie t union. lE^-teed 
i t was anxious to maintain ii^ctoal r e l a t i o n s with the Sovie t union. 
Some Pakis tanis even f e l t that the Soviet union was in a bet ter 
p o s i t i o n to appreciate t h e i r probl^ss than the vestern powers. 
At the same time i t may be argued that during t h i s period 
US-pakistani r e l a t i o n s vcre on ly in a s t a t e o£ e v o l u t i o n . There was 
no firm comniitment yet frorr. the united S ta te s that i t would underwrite 
Pakis tan ' s development. But, ac<»rding t o the Economist ,Pakistan's 
'development had a shrewd idea* a s t o who Mere i t s rea l f r i e n d s . 
**Russia i s oertair^y iK>t one of them, and in the unhappy event of a 
war breaking out betvieen the U S ^ and the v^estern E^mocracies, 
17 
Pakistan w i l l assuredly be found on the s i d e of the l a t t e r " . 
Another cons iderat ion , according t o Burke, t h t t must have 
weighed with Pakistan p o l i c y makers i n choosing western fr iendship 
a t the time was the f a c t that i n the united Nations, where the Kashmir 
case was pending, the {western countr ies enjoyed a far greater vot ing 
s t r e n g t h than Russia and her supp(»rter8. 
Liaquat*s cold shouldering of the Soviet union sore ly wounded 
t h e pride or the Sov ie t leaders t^o are highly s e n s i t i v e t o p o l i t i c a l 
snutiMi of any s o r t . HC3Bcow*a grievance on the subjec t was amrly 
expresseil to Pakistani d ip lomat i s t s for years t o cMne, and president 
Ayub Khan took s p e c i a l care i n 1965 t o f i x the dates of h i s t r i p s 
t o China, Russia and the us in the c^^der i n which the i n v i t a t i o n s 
had been rece ived . 
During 1953-^5, when Pakistan was Leing i n i t i a t e d i n t o a 
partnership with the United States for tha e x p l i c i t purpose of 
1 7 . The Economist. London, 14 Aug 1948. 
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furthering the p o l i c y o£ **contalmtent" of communism. I t va« natural 
for Pakistan t o f e e l hes i tadt abovib expanding I t s easnamic t i e s vdth 
the Soviet union. However« by 1956* Pakistan f e l t confident that 
I t s bond with the imlted ^ a t e s was strong enough t o allow I t a 
c e r t a i n amourt of scqpe for manoeuvre. Moreover, In view of the 
a c c e s s i o n t o power of a moderata leadership In the Soviet mnlon, 
America's a l l i e s were allowed a c e r t a i n aiaount of l a t i t u d e In t h e i r 
dea l ings itflth the Soviet imlon. All t h a t %«as expected of them was 
t h a t they should ensure that the ir deal ings with the Soviet union 
did not i n t e r f e r e \o.th t h e i r bas ic cotranltments t o the Western all luAca 
system. 
s o v i e t Stand on Kashmir before 19S4 
According t o some analysts# involvement in the t e r r i t o r i a l 
i s s u e div iding the natloiM of the region forms *a pecul iar aspect of 
18 
the Soviets 'South-<ASIan s t r a t e g y * . I t has a l s o bean a l l e g e d that 
the Sov ie t union took a "neutral*^, •'ncxi-cominital" or "indif ferent* 
a t t i t u d e on Kashenlr unt i l Pakistan joined the A s t e r n mi l i t ary 
a l l i a n c e when i t became pro-Indian. Facts , however do not support 
such a view. The Sov ie t union from the very beginning des ired India 
and Pakistan t o s o l v e the quest ion through t h e i r own e f f o r t s without 
any outs ide i n t e r f e r e n c e . I t did ix>t des ire t o complicate the matter 
further by taking s i d e s . The ii^stern powers, on the other hand, 
favoured I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the l^stisolr ques t ion , seeking an 
opportunity t o Join i n troubled waters . 
1 8 . Bhabani Sen G\;qpta, "The Soviet union and South Asia", i n 
Robert E. Kanet e d . , The Soviet union and the Developlna 
58 
m 1952, the Soviet r epreacn ta t ive , Jaojb Malik, out l inec 
i n d e t a i l his count ry ' s vie^ on Kasinir wher the Security Council 
took Kxp the second repor t o£ the UK Mediator, Graram Ma'iK. He. 
a t t r i b u t e d the foiar-ycar old deadlock over Ka8>3T>ir t o Uie 
Aiaglo-Aroerican proposals oi" an "anr«xa t ion i s t , imper i a l i s t ntiture* 
t o iropoae t h e i r own so lu t ion on !@8hsRir. HB sa id : "Tie pia-pose 
of t t « s e plans is interference^ i>y the US and Lfinxted Kir.v,do in 
the in te rna l a f f a i r s of Keahtr.ir, prolongation of the dispu-e 
between Inc ia ar.c Pakistan on the question . . . . and convi-rsion 
of Kasmilr i/.to a jarotectorate of t r * United Sta tes am: tije 
United Kin^coro UKC.> r tiie pre text oi renderir% c ssxstcince throi^jh 
t he United NatioriS. F ina l ly , the purpose of these plc^ns . . . i s 
t o secure the induction uf Anylo-Air^rican t roops into t i « 
t e r r i t o r y of riisixtiir unC convert i t i n to the i r colony <anc) a 
19 
m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g i c Lase." 
When the secur i ty coiuscil a . t i n met in Deccsnbtr 19i.2 the 
Soviet deleyate valer ian 2^rin r e i t e r a t e d Moscow's s t - nv, 
opposi t ion to trie induction of foreign troops i i t o K siarjir. Far 
frori explo i t ing Llie cifferenccs Letvjeen Inf i^ f^ nc }a istar. to 
ya in a footholc in South ^ i a , the USSR, on ^he cantr ry, always 
favoured a so lu t ion o- the Kasiwir dispute throw^.h t h e i r 
b i l a t e r a l e f f o r t s . H^co\% knew i t very v e i l tl*^t prolon^aticai 
Oi any c ispute bet*., en tlKi two IK ightooorina Asian c;un r i t s v.ould 
only give the Aix^lo-American bloc a nt-iv opportunity to xrJterfere 
19 . Devendra Kaushxk i n Surendra Chopra, o p . c i t * . pp. i4b-2 t '^  
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i n the a f f a i r s o£ the subcontinent . ly^v^'^ p ra i sec the cifcarts of 
Znc'ian and F^  k i a t an i Prises Ministere to solve t h i s problem t>y 
20 
peace£i>l means. It expressed the hope tha t t h iasl»iir qi*^  s t i o n 
would b solved through b i l a t e r a l nego t i a t ions . If the sovie t 
union tound i t s e l f c loser to India a f t e r Pakis tan ' s r i l i t a r y 
a l l i a n c e with the jn i ted Sta tes and i t s membership o£ the ft-ATO and 
the Baghdac' pact# i t *^s la rge ly due t o a coronon approach t o the 
probl^os of peace and sectarity charac ter i sed b^ op^<osition to 
r i v a l niilit.«ry blocs ana bases on foreic,n t e r r i t o r y . I n t i a ' s 
e l f o r t s for a peaceful sett leoient of t2:ie conf l i c t i n Korea and 
Ina3-Chij.« createc^ a favourable iropression of I n c i a ' s p ace-lovirig 
foreign policy an^ i^ouL^ht l&scow anC t.cw Delhi c loser to e^ch 
21 
o t h e r , 
ttowever, the Soviet press osntinued to show deep c5nc< rn 
ov&>r the inare^^sing American in f lu nee over m k i s t a n i p o l i t i c s * 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the unitf.d S ta tes i n t e n s i f i . d i t s &nti-
comriiariist pol icy in the a r e a . At t h i s time the State Department 
announce d t ha t t t « united States and Pakistan "have f.v,reed on 
22 
most funciamental in te rna t iona l i s sues . " The united Sta tes 
Information Service in Pakistan «»s in s t ruc t ed " t o hit^hliiw^ht the 
20« ryayda, 22 August 19S3> Also see Surenca-a Chopra, "tjasia.ir as 
a Factor in IndD-Sovi.t Relations" in Studies in Incia ' s 
FpTB^an ^ l i c v by the s^oe autiior, pp. 176-201, 
2 1 . Devendra Kaushik i n Soreiuita Chopra, o c c i t . . p . 24u. 
22 . See Joseph A. Karphy's unpublished t h e s i s "PaiJist n-SK>viet 
Relat ions with Ec^hasis on ecent Pevelojanent", Columbia 
un ivers i ty , Kew York,19b5, p.40 (AS quoted in Rec,hunoth Ram, 
SSLaS^kx' P- 27.) 
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dangers t o pcjkiatan*s pro^jress and s e c u r i t y posed by coiwf u. . .st 
23 
1 rpor la l iMB." 
The S o v i e t P re s s a"! leged t h a t t l ie United S t a t e s was not 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the i n d u s t r i a l ©nd economic development of P a k i s t a n . 
The • e s t e r n - c o n t r o i l e d I n t e r n a t i c » a l Bank for Recons t ruc t i on 
^ nd Developeaent (liiRr) ^ r e n t e d loans t o P a k i s t a n . Taf.iny atfvanta^e 
of Lhe ecoiomic h e l p l e s s n e s s of Pak i s t an i:oth t h e Unxted S t a t e s 
and Gre: t B r i t a i n v^ere i n t e r f e r i n g i n the i n ^ e r n e l and e x t e r n a l 
24 
p o l i c i e s of P a k i s t a n . The Sov i e t faress s t r o n g l y c - i t i c i s e d 
P a k i s t a n ' s accep tance o£ f o r e i g n c a p i t a l and i t s f a i l u r e t o c a r r y 
o u t democrat ic a g r a r i a n r e fo rms . I t r tminaed P a k i s t a n t h a t " t i * 
p l anned management of economy i s p o s s i b l e only with the country*8 
25 
t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s t p a t h of development." 
The S o v i e t p r e s s condonncd t h e aovernment of P a k i s t a n ' s 
"Ant 1 -Ai rc ra f t De-cnce" o rde r of J u l y IftSl. wliich i n i t s v iew, 
c o n f e r r d p r a c t i c a l l y un l imi t ed powers on the gov. rnm^nt t o t ake 
" a r b i t r a r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t p r o g r e s s i v e 1 - a c e r s , p r e s s p u b l i c a t i o n s , 
p a r t i e s and organisat ions•** 
To%«ar^ ttte end of S t a l i n ' s r u l e , the S o v i e t Unxon Le^an 
t o be s e r i o u s l y concerned about the growing o o o p e a t i o n be tv^en 
t h e United S t a t e s and pa i s t a n wi th r e f e r e n c e t o ttie Kasl^.iir 
23» I b i d . 
2 4 . Alexeyrv , "The p o l i t i c a l S i t u a t i o n i n p a k l s t « r " , Lev Times. 
Ko. Sl# 19i>l. 
2 5 . L i t e r t u r n l a Gaze ta . 25 J a n 1952, p . 22 . 
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d i spute and the s i t u a t i o n i n tiie region of the Hiadle £ « r t . Th« 
view that vas projected It^ the S o v i e t press v^ as that the united 
s t a t e s vifts not i n t e r e s t e d i n a ^ l u t i o n of the Kashmir dispute* 
On the contrary* i t ««nted Kashmir to becsane a t r u s t t e r r i t o r y o£ 
t h e united Nations . In view o€ i t s dtMninant p o s i t i o n in the vorld 
body* the united States would tt^n be ab le t o obta in bases i n 
26 
Kashmir ancl strengthen the "defence l i n e i n Southern Asia," 
The Soviet Press was c r i t i c a l of Pakistan's p o l i c y on thtn 
i s s u e i n view of tha t country's c l o s e proc in i ty t o the Sov ie t 
border. 
The Soviet union VAU a l s o extremly s e n s i t i v e to the American 
moves and psk i s tan ' s response e:.ncerniijiy the Middle £ s t area . 
I t warned the Government of Pakistan that the Miccle East ccnamand 
was an ins trusent of \B anc B r i t i s h aggress ive po l i cy and that 
27 
Pakistan should declare openly that i t hi&d ix>thiny t o do with i t . 
The r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the "national bourgeoisie" i n the 
p o s t - s t a l i n s t period brought about a marked improvement i n s o v i e t 
r e l a t i o n s with the countries of the Third v^orld. The "eastward 
s h i f t " i n Soviet p o l i c y was occasioned a l s o by the events taking 
place a t the time i n Asia such as the oner^exK^ of Evarma* Incda* 
Indcnesia* and Pakistan as independent s t a t e s * the establ ishment 
of c»mmur.ist ru le i n mainland China* the crea t ion of the South East 
2 6 . PravcB* 14 Nov 19SO. 
2 7 . I b i d . , 17 Aug 1952. 
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Asian-Treaty Org&nization (SEATO) and a l s o he establishiDent a£ 
28 
Anerican m i l i t a r y bases i n Pakistan* South Vietnam* and Thailand. 
The <te8ire i n nev s o v i e t leaders t o improve t h e i r country's 
r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan vuui maos ev ident by G.M* Malenkov i n a 
statement i n the Su^x^ne Soviet o£ the USSR as e a r l y as 3 Aix^ust 
1953. "The Soviec union at taches great i^.partance t o the 
s u c c e s s f u l dsvelopoent of r e l a t i o n s with pakistiin and to 
29 
strengthening every kind ot r e l a t i o n s between the two s t a t e s . " 
pai.istan* however* did not c^ioose to respond favourably 
t o t h i s overtvk e . On the contrary* i t appeared wholly concerned 
a t t h i s time about cor«3 l idat ion of i t s lir;ks with the arch enemy 
o£ the Soviet tAiion > oairoly the united States* pakisven's 
coo lness tov.erds the Soviet overture v>as r»t* o£ course , cue t o 
any overt h o s t i l i t y to the Soviet Union a s such, i h e Soviet 
union ho%«ever< could not remain unconcerned about the s t e a d i l y 
growing rapport bet%#een Karachi and Washington p a r t i c u l a r l y when 
moves tMure a f o o t i n the Middle East t o cr€»at« a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e 
system with i t s main tturust d irec ted aga ins t t h e communist world. 
Wh«n the nevs o£ the US dec i s i on t o extend m i l i t a r y a id t o paKistan 
reac ted Moscow* Hbscow once ayain t r i e d to persuade Pakistan not 
2 8 . R. vaidyanath,"Some Recent T r e n ^ i n Soviet P o l i c i e s 
Towards India and Pakistan", Internat ional S tudies , 
Bcxnbay* v o l . 7* p . 430. 
2 9 . R.h. j a in* Sovlet-South Asian R e l a t i o n s . 1947-1978* 
V:>1. ^* p . 8 . 
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t.o acoeipt that ald« Pakistan* however* ignored t i ^ Soviet 
preytest and signed a military pact with the United s tates in 
30 
February 19&4. 
When the Soviet union thus fa i l ed to persuade Pakistan not 
to join the anti-Soviet military al l iance systen sponsored by the 
united States» i t f e l t that i t had not option except t o forge 
c lose and friendly ^ies with India - a po1^ 'er which appeared to be 
r e s i s t i n g the Maerioan power thrust into the subccoitinent as 
much as the Soviet IMion i t s e l f . And within a re la t ive ly short 
span of time the two countries drew very close to each other. 
The soviet Union began to extend to India ccMisiderable economic 
and defence a i d . what VAS more significant* i t rea<Sily underwroce 
India's claim to the s tate of Kashmir. The extension o£ OS militcury 
aid to Pakistan and the open Soviet support for India on the 
Kashmir issue had the e f f ec t of involving the t«io r ival at^ser 
powers direct ly in the p o l i t i c s of the Indo-pakistani subcontinent 
31 
anc in internationalizing the indo-pakistani conf l i c t over Kashmir. 
The year 19&4 witnessed the Soviet-pak r d a t i o n s at a low 
ebb. An ant i 'Soviet propaganda was unleashed in the wake of the 
mil i tary pact with the united States . The pro-government pa>d.stani 
press was fu l l of tales about the so-cal led oppression o~ the 
30, "pa i s tan's Relations with the USfR", lakistan i^rison. 
>carachi« vol . 14* iio* 1* p. 41 in paghunath nam« op.c i t . 
p. 37. 
31 . Paghunath R«n* o p . c i t . . p. 37. 
64 
Musl im i n the USSR and the a l l e g e d Soviet in ter ference i n the 
domestic a f f a i r s of Pakistan. The coenun^st party was banned by 
t h e governaent and a cMpaign oi mass a r r e s t s and repress icm \a8 
launched aga ins t party vortosrs and a c t i v i t i e s ot the Pakistan* 
32 
S o v i e t Friendship Soc ie ty . Despite Pakis tani goveriraent*s openly 
h o s t i l e and unfriendly a t t i t u d e * the Soviet union never gave vp 
ges tures for ij^provcnent of r e l a t i o n s fron i t s s i d e . 
The second half of the 19&0tt witnessed consicierable 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n USSR~Pak r e l a t i o n s . The Sov ie t proces t note of 
14 April 1958 warn.d that i n view of i t s geographical praociinity t o 
thm s o v i e t union "grave consequences" v.oalc inevit.ably a u a i t 
Pakistan* " i t i .s t e r r i t o r y %iill be allotted t o be used fear the 
e s t a b l i s h n e n t of m i l i t a r y bases for the purpose of using them 
ac^ainst the Sov ie t Union." Attent ion was drawn to the construct ion 
of launching grounds for guided m i s s i l e s and rockets* and of 
m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s and runways for landing OKadern bombers of 
s t r a t e g i c a v i a t i o n . I t v.as cHophasiaed that* s ince Pakistan did 
not posjess these weapons* the f a c i l i t i e s would be used by the 
uni ted s t a t e s and i t s other a l l i e s . Moreover* i t -.as pointed out 
t h a t a t t h e Ankara CEKTO neet lng* Pakistan had asked for the 
33 
arming of the Treaty countr ies v.ith rockets and atcxnic weapons. 
3 2 . Dev^  ndra Kaushik* "Soviet Union*s Pakistan po l i cy i A Survey 
and Appraisal" i n Surendra Chopra* or^.c^t.* p . 243. 
3 3 . IfiBJ2a«B' 25 May 1958* i n J . P . j a i n * Sov ie t Po l i cy Tot>ards 
Pakistan anf Lenaladesh. Kew Delhi* 1974* p . 52 . 
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The P a k i s t a n Government's note i n r e p l y , handed over t o 
t h e Sov ie t hwt&Bsm&^r on 24 H&y 19&8« s t a t e d t l ^ t Sov i e t oi;>Jectlons 
t o r a k i s t a n ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y errangenrenta 
were " n o t cooprefriensible** i n view of t h e i rsR*8 own a s s o c i a t i o n i n 
p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e * v i z . the w rsew p a c t . I t was f u r t h e r 
s t a t e d t h a t by i t s membership of thet SEATO and the CENTO, f^Kistan 
v;as t r y i n g t o nake a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t i t u n p r o f i t a b l e * t h e r e b y 
iniputiny a y g r e s s i v e motives to t l » ^ v i e t lAiion. Itie note denied 
t h e e x i s t e n c e of launching s i t e s for guided t a i s s i l e s i n P a k i s t a n . 
o n t h e o t h e r tencl» the tJSSR *a8 c r i t i c i z e d for keepiiK* a l l t y p e s 
of t n i l i t a r / bases and weav>on« Xn c l o s e proximi ty t o pcikis tan . 
The Pak i s t an note termed Sov i e t c r i t i c i o m of fcsreign m i l i t a r y 
34 
bases i n P a k i s t a n a s " b a s e l e s s a l l e g a t i o n s " . 
The Sov ie t Aide Merooire of 20 De^mber I9bd expresned 
concern over the n e g o t i a t i o n s t o r a b i l a t e r a l t^greesnent between 
P a k i s t a n and the United S t a t e s . I t s t a t e d t h a t ttie ayre^oent 
"caniiOt b u t izxfringe tlcie i n t e r e s t s of t h e Soviet un ion ' s secvari ty*. 
I t a l s o warned P a k i s t a n of " p o s s i b l e o in sequences" . ^ 
A Sovie t Govemnent d e l e g a t i o n v i s i t i n g Ind ia i n March 1959, 
d e s c r i b e d t h e UB-pakistan b i l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y ag re^nen t a s c^ rcc ted 
r o t only aga i rw t t h e ^ v i e t Union biit " f i r s t of a l l a g a i r s t t h e 
36 
ne ighbours of P a k i s t a n — - I n d i a and Afghanis tan" . 
34. J . p . j a in , o p . c i t . , 
3 5 . Ibi<^»' P» - 3 
3 6 . i ^ i i ^ 
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Soviet e i . forts t o improve r e l a t i ^ u i with Pakistan continued^ 
the m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e with the US notwithstanding. In 19i6 Balganin 
o f f e r e d Feis.istan t e d i n i c a l knowhow for peaceful uses ot atomic 
energy . Pakistan's Republic ray ce l ebrat ion i n Moscow was attended 
by the Sovie t Foreign Minister who hinted tiiat the Sov ie t government 
would be w i l l i n g t o construct a s t e e l plant in Pakistan a s i t did 
37 
i n Ind ia . The Vice-Chairroan of the Soviet Council of Min i s ters , 
Aneistas Mikoyan* attended the inauguration of the Republic of 
Pakistan i n i^rachi and i n v i t e d the %>eaker of the Pakistan 
Const i tuent Assembly t o v i s i t the US9% viith a parlitunentary 
38 
d e l e g a t i o n . On II June 1956 the ISSR announced a gii:t of 16«500v 
tons o£ r i c e t o help Pakistan t i d e ov&r a food c r i s i s . Towards the 
c l o s e or the month the two countr ies concluded a trade agreement 
which accorded eacdi other the. s ta tus o£ a m ^ t favoured nat ion 
regarding impart and export . The Sov ie t Government once <3;:,ain 
i n v i t e d the Prime Minister of Pakistan t o v i s i t the USSR« but l i k e 
Li^quat A l i Khan# Sui^Yawardy too preferred t o go to the USA. Fatima 
39 
j inriah's v i s i t t o the USSR a l s o could not material l e e . 
The mili-..ary coup of October 1958 which brought General Ayub 
Khan t o pover did not create an atmosphere iavou^-able for c l o s e 
r l a t i o n s with the USSR. Ayub iOian l^d been mainly -nstrixnental in 
3 7 . The Dawn, Karachi, 26 March lv*56 es quoted by rcvendra xaushik 
in Surendre Chopra, o p . c i t . . p . 249. 
3 8 . Ktete Tiroes. HJ, 14, 29 March 19t6 , p . 31 i n Devendra :«ushik, 
3 9 . Devendra KeushAk, o p . c i t . . p . 249. 
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forgincj Pakistan** m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e with the west . Hoacow was 
convinced that haahington v^a behind Ayub Khan's s e i zure of pov/er. 
The Report of the Central Coainittee oi the CPSU t o the 21st party 
Congress he ld that the inillt.ary cov^ In Pakistan v«as i n d i c a t i v e 
of the attack, which i s "developing a&jainst the decDOcratic w^ins of 
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peoples who have %ron p o l i t i c a l iniSependence.* 
presi<^nt Ayub Khan described the subcontinent as vulna^rable 
and ta lked of "mm-ual m i l i t a r y defence" between Int'ia and Pakistan. 
He exprcMised a s imi lar view i n an a r t i c l e i n Foreign Af £ a i r s , 
"AS a s tucent o: var and strategy**« he s t a t e d i n that a r t i c l e * he 
saw "quite c l e a r l y the inexorable push of the north i n the 
d i r e c t i o n of the v>ann waters of the Indian ocean." lie arded that 
tharc could be chcdoaated i f India and Pi k i s tan s top squabbling 
each other« "resolve our probl^ss** and "disengac^e our .ixmed forces 
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from facing inwards." 
Al l such o f f e r s of "joint defence* with India eroanting from 
pak i s t rn , says J . p . J£in# were condit ionoton the sett lenient of the 
Kashmir problem t o the s a t i s f a c t i o n of P^ : Kistan. The ^oint defence 
proposal* i t seemed* was designed as a sop t o us c r i t i c s of 
Pakistan i n order t o maintain the flow of massive ecoriomxc and 
m i l i t a r y a i d from ^shinc«t .n . That proposal was a l s o aimec? a t 
disarmii^ India s o that on any s u i t a b l e occas ion rakistan could 
^^* £ £ S 2 ^ * *^ ^ January 1959 i n Cevendra Kaushik* o p . c i t . ^ p . 250. 
4 1 . J . P . Jain* op«c i t . * p . 56. 
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proceed to occ^py the whole oi Kashmiri as %#a8 amply proved 1^ the 
events of Auyust-SeF^eniber 196S« the 83-<alled offer of joint 
defence tniyht a lso have been intended as a tenpting bait to lure 
India with a view to malign her policy of non-alignment and to 
jeopardise hor relations with the comrounist c»VBitries# especial ly 
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with the Soviet union. 
when the Soviet uni^n fa i l ed to persuade pa istan to lower 
i t s commitnent to the i^stern-sponsored military al l iance system* 
i t again declared i t s unequivocal support for India. During the 
tfight years that Khrushchev reosined in po%«er« the Kashcr.ir issua 
came «p twice before the Security Council. On ooth occasions 
the Soviet Govfrnoent gave India firm and so l id support. In 
January 1957# the Soviet Union stood so l id ly on the s ice of India 
and opposed the proposal to hold a p lebisc i te in Koshmir under ths 
UK auspices and to s tat ion an internatioDSl :.orce there. It 
vetoed a resolution that was supported by the imited States , in 
January 1962« when the Kashmir question again came up for discussion 
in the Security Council, the Soviet delegate rejected the Pakistani 
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case and bacKed the po l i t i ca l stand taken by India. 
in 1964, however, one noticed a subtle a^ange in the Soviet 
stonce on the indo^pakistani i s sue . This change was due to a 
4 2 . Ibid. 
4 3 . Raghunath Ram, o p . c i t . . pp. 64-5. 
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d e c i s i o n by the new Soviet leadership t o play 6OVR Khrushchev's 
cmrmtitnent t o India a l i t t l e . Soviet fr iendship for India had 
been one of the pr inc ipal fac tors behind the r i f t between Moscow 
and Peking, perhaps Moscxw tliouglit t h a t i f i t were a l i t t l e l e s s 
loud>'in i c s sup^port for India , pekiny would be appeased* In any 
case# i n the Securi ty Council debate on Kashmir i n m y 1^64, 
s o v i e t sq^sport for Incia was subdued. For t h e f i r s t tirae i n the 
uni ted Nations the Soviet delegate recognized the e x i s t e n c e of 
a dispute over Kashmir and c a l l e d upon both India and Pakistan to 
r e s o l v e i t p e a c e f u l l y . This s u b t l e chanye i n s t ra tegy allowed the 
s o v i e t union to net qui te a b i t of diplastat ic sucoers i for i t 
made an innediate impact on Pakistan, and Moscow was able t o 
prepare the ground £ar a rapid improvenent i n i t s r e l a t i o n s with 
that country. Moscow needed to improve i t s r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan 
i n order to counter China's increasing inf luence there and a l s o 
t o take advantage of Pakistan's disenchantment with i t s m i l i t a r y 
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pact v i t h the United S t a t e s . 
The Soviet Union and Pakistan continued t o conduct nego-
t i a t i o n s on Sov ie t technica l a s s i s t a n c e for o i l e>plorat ion and 
mineral prospecting even during the t ens ion over the U->2 inc ident . 
In Ai^:just 1960, Pakistan announced acceptance of the Sovit^t o f f e r . 
Negot ia t ions were almost complete before the departure of Z.A.I^utto, 
t h e then Pakistani Minister for Natural Resources, for Moscow i n 
44* JOiMA» P* 6^* 
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recember 1^60. in January 1961* the Soviet union ^c.ve F^^Kistan a 
loncj term loan of 3L. mt l l l ^n do l la r s to r o i l e>.plO'«tioR, 
Tjhaw in Sovlet»Pak Relations 
The ytar 1961 saw a thaw in tli«= Soviet- , ak r€:l<itions« 
Turing 1961-62 c u l t u r a l c^otacts betiieen the two countr ies 
r e g i s t e r e d a sharp increase . Soviet scholars and s c i e n t i s t s 
v i s i t e d pakis tsn and severe^ Pakis tani osleyat ions t r ave l l e c t o the 
USSR. In Janistry 19tJ , the Soviet Pzaroier r e c e i v e the l e k i s t a n i 
Foreic^n Minis ter , sa f ru l l ah Khan. The o i l agreement »^ as folleafed 
by a bar ter o «1 i n August 1963 and an a i r agreeieent in octobrr 
1963. Pakistan a l so beyan t o tu rn away froia an ac t ive p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n SLATO and CU?IO. I t declined t o pa-^ticipate in - EATu mi l i t a ry 
an^ naval exercises nc came out lor a p aceful set t lement j£ the 
Viet»-in problem, i t was one of the f i r s t s t a t e s v/nxcn siyned tlie 
Koscow Test Bcin Treaty . Thus the period 15*63-64 saw a decisive 
t u r n t o w a r d tlie iniproveiBent of pa^^istan's r e l a t i o n s with the 
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Soviet i^.ion. 
Ayub Khan's v i s i t to tue Soviet l^nion in A-^ril 1^65 v#as tlie 
f i r s t r i r e c t personal contact i n 18 ye<irs between the top It-acers 
of pa>.is'an anr the USSR. Ayub K'mn was accoo^r. ied by i s 
Foreign Minister Z.A, Bhutto who signed on 7 April li»65 three 
egreeroents on tra<fe# econcMnic coc^jeration tno cu l t u r a l cxchi^nge; 
the t r ade agre^rocnt provided for an exp&nsion ojt Soviet-pa isdstan 
t r c d c from the value of ... 6 mi l l i on to . 12 mi l l ion by 1-67. 
4 5 . Devendra ^eushik, o p . c ^ t . . rp« 252-.S3, 
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under the econonic agreenent the Soviet lAiion agreed to grant 
Pakistan a loan of ss, 150 rail l ion to ^« 250 mil l ion £or tha 
purchase of capital g o o ^ and the agreectent of 1:^ 61 on Soviet 
cooperation in o i l prospecting tms extended b^ five years. 
The cultural agreenent provided for exchango of students* 
s c i e n t i s t s and sportsoen* translation of books* tolcing of 
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exhibition* e t c . 
Yet even though the improvesient in the Soviet relat ions 
\«ith Pakistan in the early s i x t i e s oannot be attributed t o the 
Soviet-US entente and Sino-Sovlet r i f t* the part played h^ the 
newly esierging g l c to l and regional environnent can not be ent ire ly 
ignored. In this period Pakistar. had started cultivating China 
t o improve i t s bargaining po«#er in relat ion to India* the Soviet 
union and the %ited States whi<d) prosipted M x^icov to intensify 
i t s e f forts t o %«ean Pakistan away fron China. Moreover* Pakistan 
was getting dis i l lus ioned with the United States which had shown 
i t s eagerness to give India military assistance in the %«ake of the 
Sino^Indian border conf l ict in 1962. Moscow was a l so %tforried at 
the emergence in India of eleaents opposed t o friendship with the 
USSR in the post-Neluru period. All tiJLs provided additional 
stimulus to the policy ol establishing improved relat ions with 
Pakistan which Moscow had been pursuing since 1949. without 
turning i t s back v^ pon India* the Soviet Uni:^ sought to broaden 
the base of i t s South-Asian policy by normalising i t s relations 
46 . KeesiHa*s Oontemporarv A-chives. 1956* p. 20797. 
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v i t h Pakistan. 
The Soviet leaders were apparently a o s t re luc tant t o see 
a nev m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t between India and pakis t n l e s t China 
should intervene on behalf of Pakistan and force Mciicovi t o go 
t o the a i d of India . Throughout 1964 and i n the f i r s t half of 
1965 MOSCOW repeatedly urged India and Pakistan to s e t t l e t h e i r 
d i f f erences without outside i n t e r v e n t i o n . When Pakis tani Army 
iRO ^ t e d a second comoufla^d invas ion of Kashroir in Auyust 1961, 
t h e s o v i e t union ntaii^ained a s tudied s i l e n c e . Indeed the e n t i r e 
m i l i t a r y operat ion went unreported i n the Sov ie t E^ess. 
When the Kashmir f i g h t i n g led t o an a l l - o u t v^r bet%>een 
Inc ia and Pakistan the Soviet Goverment took a n o n - a r t i s a n 
a t t i t u d e with a view t o enabling i t s e l f t o laring vhe war t o an 
e a r l y end. I t did not blame Pakistan for the war. The Soviet Union 
c a s t i t s e l f i n the ro l e of a mediator in orcer t o proa^te c e s s a t i o n 
of h o s t i l i t i e s i n the sub-cont inent . To that end i t i n i t i a t e d 
a s e r i e s of d ip los t t t i e moves and f i n a l l y succeded i n arranging a 
meeting between the Indian prime Minister* Lai ^hadur Shastr i and 
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the Pakis tani pres ident Ayub IChan. a t Tashkent. 
Tfte P08t-l96S Cevclopsients 
In Mdy-June 1966 a nine member Sov ie t parliamentary de legat ion 
headed by K.T. Kazurov v i s i t e d Pakistan. In response to a s o v i e t 
4 7. Cevendra Kaushik# 0 |a .c i t* . p . 254. 
4 8 . Raghuooath Rain# o p . c ^ t . . p . 66 . 
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invitation* the Pakistani military roisaion headed by Air Marshall 
Malik Nur Khan %iaa in Mo«cow froai 26 juna to 7 July 1966. A 
report circulated frcm Moscow on the Soviet e m s 8i4>ply to Pakistan 
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vas contradicted by the Soviet o f f i c ia l c i rc l e s on 27 July 1966. 
The USSR stepped up i t s econcnic aid to Pakistan in the wake of 
the Tashkent agreenient. itywards the end of 1966 i t offered 
$80 mil l ion in a id . Zt also agreed to grant a credit of ss. 600 
mi l l ion tor constructing 15 broadcasting s ta t ions . In Moscov. the 
Pakistani Education Minister signed an agreement on cultural and 
s c i e n t i f i c exchange for ths year 1967-63. 
The Soviet union never lito>d the id^t of promoting an 
arms race betvieen Zndis and Pakistan as i t would Yi^ve been 
harmful to the economic development of the t\K> countries. It ««as# 
hovever* obliged to supply arms for India's securi ty . It supplied 
Ineia only a reasonable quantity of arBW to help meet ncarmal 
(tefence requirements whidh acquixsd a new urgency in the l ight of 
China's h o s t i l i t y . In 1968 Moscow agreed to simply su-7 fighter 
bombers to India. This decision came in for sharp cri t ic ism in 
Pakistan. In April the same year Kosygin v i s i t e d Pakistan on the 
f i r s t ever v i s i t by a Sovist head o£ the government. Kosygin was 
greeted with slogans l ike "Give us tanks not tractors**. under 
these circunstaiMses, Moscow vas compelled to st^iply a very limited 
SO 
quantity of arms to Pakistan. 
4 9 . Jteian R<»CQrder. 1966, pp. 7C82 and 7236. 
50 . Devendra Kaushik, o p . c i t . . pp. 258-59. 
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Soviet A t t i t u ^ TQ%<ards Pakistan; The Post 1970 Periods 
The 1971 ^^r and After 
The hopes of Improved Indo-pak r e l a t i ons which were 
r a i s e c by the vic tory of democratic forces in the general e l ec t ion 
held in December 1970 in Pakistan vcere dashed uhen ttie mi l i t a ry 
Junta cracked ^wn upon the popular representative?? in East Bengal 
t o sv^jpress the ^^ice of 75 mi l l ion people expressed through the 
t ^ l l o t . The mass t e r ro r l e t loc^e by the Islamabad m i l i t a r y 
d i c t a t o r s h i p r e su l t ed i n the exodus of mi l l ions ol refugees t o the 
neighbourii^j t e r r i t o r y of Inc ia , leadir^ to new tens ion in the 
Indo-pak r e l a t i o n s . 
The Soviet union vrss the f i r s t big power t o r e a l i s e the 
g rav i ty of the s i t u a t i o n and t o see in i t a major t h r ea t t o peace 
and secu r i t y in South Asia. At a time when both Peking and 
Washington were t r y i r ^ to condone the blood-bath in East Bengal as 
an " in te rna l af fa i r* of Pakistan, the Soviet president Nikolai 
podgorny i n h i s l e t t e r of 2 April 1971 t o the Pakistan president 
Yahya Khan, appealed t o "s top the bloo<^hed and repressioriS against 
t he population In Eaet pa kistan**, and r e s o r t t o "methods of 
5.1 
peaceful p o l i t i c a l aevelcipment,** 
The Jo in t In<te>-Soviet statament on Gromyko's v i s i t t o 
Kew Delhi t o s ign the Indo-Sovlet Treaty a l so ca l l ed "thc^t urgent 
s t eps be taker, in East Pakistan for the achievement of a p o l i t i c a l 
- ! • Pravda. 4 A r i l 19 71. 
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s o l u t i o n and for the crea t ion of conditior4i of sa f e ty for the 
S2 
return of the refugees t o t h e i r licwes," 
On 7 October 1971« the spo)ccsttian of the i^kist^ini Foreign 
Of f i ce objected t o Kc«ygin*8 c r i t i c i s m of the >^hya regime's 
acti^^n. He a l s o a l l e g e d triat the recent Indo-Soviet Treaty nad 
"encouraged India t o s t e p up provocative a c t i v i t i e s a^^ainst 
Pakistan". He asked Moscow t o take not i ce of "the. aggress ive 
d i s p o s i t i o n of the Incdan armed forces ayainst the rakistan borders 
i n both • i the wings." On 8 October 1971, a j o i n t statement ^f 
t h e USSR and Al<^eria declared t h e i r "respect for the K^tional 
un i ty anc^  t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of pak.<^tan and Incia". Th^ two 
s t a t e s appealed t o both New Delhi and Islamabad t o f ind a peaceful 
s o l u t i o n to the problem confronting them "according with the 
p r i n c i p l e s of ton interference* mutual respect* good neighbour 
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r e l a t i o n s and the s p i r i t of the Tashkent meeting." Comnienting on 
i t « an Indian researcher has gone t o the extent of describing i t 
a s "an example ot Sov ie t diplomatic dup l i c i ty" , an attempt* on the 
part of MOSCOW, to s e e a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n of the problem which 
54 
would not put a major s t r a i n on Soviet->Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . 
v^hen a f u l l - s c a l e war broke out ijetween India and Pakistan 
a s a r e s u l t of surprise paKistani a i r a t tacks on Incian a i r f i e l d s 
5 2 . Thft Times of India . Kew Delhi , 13 Aug 1971. 
- 3 . liSiu£ia&&' **«>• ^2 (October 1971) 37 i n J , p . j a i n , o p . c i t . . 
p . 132. 
5 4 . K.D. Fapur, The Sov ie t Union and the Emergence of Banaladpah. 
M.Fl&il d i s s e r t a t i o n , jawaharlal Nehru u n i v e r s i t y , Kew Delhi , 
1973. 
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on the evening of 3 DecesUaer 1971» the Soviet prefnier A*N. Xosygin 
declared i n txls press conference in Denmrk tha t the Soviet union 
was "qui te reaaolutAly* in favour o£ ending the v^ar i n the Incian 
s ul>-cootinent and bringing about a peacefiil sett leinent bet%«een the 
f j r ces of Bangladesh ana paiOAtan. 
On 6 t)eceaiber 1971 the Soviet union exercised i t s second 
ve to t o block another reso lu t ion i n the Securi ty Council bucked by 
the United S t a t e s . This r e so lu t ion made no reference to a p o l i t i c a l 
s e t t l e n e n t in East Bengal. The UK General Assenbly passed a 
r e s o l u t i o n on 3 December 1971 sponsored by Argentina ca l l ing i;^on 
India and Pakistan " to take f(»rthv>lth a l l measures for an imnoediate 
cease f i r e and for the withcraval of t h e i r armed forces"* from emelh 
o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r y , on 13 DeceiBber 19 71 the Soviet Union used i t s 
ve to lor the t t d r d t i n e t o prevent the passage of a r e so lu t ion 
moved by the United Sta tes i n the secur i ty Council ca l l ing for 
cease f i re luarelated to p o l i t i c a l se t t l ement , tfm Polish reso lu t ion 
which urged that Pakistan stK^uld take s teps tor a peaceful t r ans fe r 
of pov.«r i n the "«>stern t hea t r e of coriflict" to the lawfully 
e l e c t e d representa t ions ot the pec^le , headed by Sheikh Kujibur 
Rehman «^s supported b / the Soviet delegate as "the co r rec t 
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approach." 
The Simla Agreement of 3 Ju ly 1972 between the Prime Minister 
of Xneia and the president of Pa^ietan Miich provided for the 
withdrawal c^ Indian and Pakis tani forces to t h e i r s ides of the 
i S . Ttff H3>P^ H?^ ffll timu* Delhi* 6 Dec 1911. 
E6. ThB TJffiCa tf l^i^* Kew Delhi, 17 Dec 1971. 
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international border < nd acceptance by both 9i<Ses ot the l ine of 
control in i@tstnir reeultiny £rc») the ceasefire o£ 17 December 1971 
was welccMD d by the Soviet president Po<^orny. Pr^y^« in an 
a r t i c l e on the s i tuat ion in Pakistan cal led the Simla agreement 
"an important step along the road o£ normalisation of DoKlstani-
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Indian relations anc the whole s i tuat ion in South Asia.** 
s o v i e t Action in Afohanistam Its Repercussions an the Soviet-Pak 
The appearance of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 
r«cember 1979 i s not* what many in the . e s t Y»ve described* a new 
version of ths 19th century, 'Greet Game*, neither the fear of the 
r i s e of an Islamic f undaoMentalist regime in the v i c in i ty of the 
Southern territory ox the soviet Union inhabited by 35 mil l ion 
Muslins nor the drive towards warm iMiters of the Gulf and i t s rich 
o i l wells forced the Kr«»lin to send i t s troops to the Khyber pass. 
With the active connivance of the United States , the Sl^h of Iran 
intens i f ied his e f fects to reduce the Soviet influence in the 
region and create a new Iran oriented power sphere comprising India, 
pakist< n, the Gulf s tates and Afghanistan. The Sl»h be<^ an to 
undermine the Soviet influence by stepping up aid to Kabul and by 
using the Savak to destroy the Afghan coromunxsts. imder his 
influence Daud sacked the Soviet trained o f f i cers , made alternate 
^f* Pravda. 15 Aug 1972 in Cevendra KaushiJc« ^SB^jfSASU* P* ^^< 
Dsgy / r -J 
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trainiog arrangetDenta with India and Egypt and even torote the 
5B 
c o a l i t i o n vith the parchan communists. 
The Afghan c r i s i s cane in handy for the n i l i t a r y Junta of 
Gen. Zia desperately looking for a l l possible %i«ys of legitimisiny 
i t s rule including resort to Islamic fundanentalien to boost up 
i t s sagging iaage. It a l so Irightened the prospects ot the 
2ia regiae for gett ing international support fron the inltec: 
s tates and I^itain as well as fron sorw oi. the o i l - r i c h regimes 
in ii«st Asia. The o i l i cary Jimta i n Pakistan a l so hoped to reap 
soiae "short run benefits at honm" by "distracting attention fron 
domestic probl«iis and making p e ^ l e fee l that now i s not the time 
to rock the boat** • "All these considerations" wrote Edward 
Mortimer in the Times (London) in i t s issue ot 3C J^sril I980« 
"make a strong ai:li;i->Soviet l ine attract ive ." 
Thus the Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha She hi demanded in 
the UM General jmaemhly "immediate* unconditional and total 
withdra%»al of Soviet troops" tdrtoae pres. noe in Afghanistan was 
described by him not Just "a bi lateral m&tter" but s»oethin^ %Aiich 
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"jeopardized peace and security in the region aoc the world." 
MOSCOW hi^ ho%ievor t r i ed to maintein normal relat ions with 
Pakistan even in the face of grave provocations by the zia regime* 
58. Thf? T ^ i r o^ I«c;iB. Kew Delhi* 7 jan 1981. 
5 9 . tsevendra Kaushik* o p . c i t . . p . 266. 
6 0 . The pa%>p. Karachi* 12 jan 1980. 
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t8 pan-islair.lc propaganda a g a i m t the Soviet union, open support 
t o the Mujahidacn and attenpta t o forga a united anti<->Soviet front 
u l t h the (toited S ta te s and China, j u s t before Brezhnev's v i s i t 
t o India In Decenber 1980« through h i s t a l k s with General z;ia.ul-ii&q# 
Agha Shahl and Shah Ka%i«2# the Sovie t Anbai^ador i n pak.istan, 
V l t a l y SBirnov, reassured Pakistan that the Sk>vlet l e a d e r ' s New Delhi 
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v i s i t was not alned a t forging an anti«>paklstan f r o n t . 
In January 1981 i t appeared a s i f Pakistan was veering 
round to a negot ia ted p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e a e n t of the Afghan c r i s i s * 
On 3 January 1981 i n h i s l e t t e r to the UN Secretary General 
Kurd waldhelro, the Pakistani Foreign Minis ter , Agha Shahl requested 
f o r the appoiatnei^ o£ a spec ia l representat ive " in order t o 
promote a dialogue among the ^ n o e m e d p a r t i e s for a p o l i t i c a l 
s o l u t i o n of the Afghan c r i s i s . " He a l s o expressed the b e l i e f that 
"the a u t h o r i t i e s i n Kabul were prepared t o j o i n t h i s dialogue 
under the a e g i s and in the presence of the Secretary General or 
h i s representat ive i n t l « l r capaci ty a s representa t ives of the 
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p e o p l e ' s Cenocratic party of Afghanistan." The l e t t e r no here 
s a i d e x p l i c i t l y that the t a l k s were t o be t r i l a t e r a l , i . e . between 
Pakis tan , Iran and Afghanistan. I t a l s o did not mention the 
General Assembly Rssolutlon of 20 November 1980. On 31 January 1981 
Zia-ul-Haq spoke of "thaw i n the Sovie t stand on Afghanistan." 
6 1 . Devendra Ksushik, o o . c l t ^ . p . 267. 
6 2 . Tha Indian Express. New Delhi , 6 Feb 1981. 
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After h i s return from the Talf eunnl t he spoKe o£ sone " f l e x i b i l i t y " 
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£ron the Sov ie t s i d e of %A\ich "we ttfant t o take benefit.** 
But a t the New Delhi Non>aligned Meet the Fakietani Foreign 
Minister ^ » n g e d h i s tone , i f a t Taif he had persuaded the heads 
of the XBianic s t a t e s not t o condemn the Sov ie t union by name* a t 
Kev Delhi he did the opposi te and backed out frora h i s o £er of t a l k s 
w i t h Kftbul* The reason for t h i s v o l t e face i s obvioua. Pakistan 
must have used i t s t t o e e t t o negot ia te with the USSR t o gain a 
more generous US n i l i t a r y and economic a i d than the %AQO m i l l i o n 
"peanut** package OL the US aid* Pakistan i s reported t o have got 
c learance for the a c q u i s i t i o n of the l a t e s t F«>16 Aserlcan f i g h t e r s . 
Chinese are a l s o b e l i e v e d t o have helped i n b u i l d i i ^ ten a i r bases 
i n Pakistan* 
while the s o v i e t Unicm has p e r s i s t e n t l y souyht to expan<5 the 
scope of cooperation with Pakistan t o procaote the corarnon s truggle 
agaiiurt imperialism ^nd t o help Pakistan advance towards independent 
economic develqpnent the intransigence of the ru l ing e l i t e i n 
Islamabad and i t s t o t a l apathy toviards the popular a s p i r a t i o n s of 
the am:i<-liRperiallst aassws l^s become a asiiisg which cannot be 
overcome merely by l^scow's un i la tera l des i re for good^neighbourly 
r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan. 
If Pakistan's withdrawal from the aggress ive m i l i t a r y 
a l l i a n c e s videned the scope of a cooperat ive r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
6 3 . The Times a£ Ind ia . Hew Delh i . 1 Feb 1981. 
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Che USSR MTltes Etebar.jL sen Gi^ta* i t s gravitation towards the 
Sino-US axis and assunption o£ a key role in the nev» us aggressiv* 
mil i tary strategy in Asia uiKter the rule o£ i t s military Junta has 
crsated a schisn which can only be bridged p^ by a soc io -po l i t i ca l 
transfomation in paiastan. "Irtpite of the US and Saudi lar^^esse 
ths iimnoral regisie i s out to sur>press the l i b e r t i e s o£ the fraternal 
people o£ Pakistan." That counfcry,feels Siabani Sen Gupta, a{K)ears 
to be heading towards a nev breakup uz»3er the weight of i t s own 
contradictions. If such a s i tuat ion rea l ly arises« an active 
invdlveaent by the Soviet t»kiOQ in the affairs beyond the Khyber to 
conteract the US-Chinese Intrigues and machinations in a region 
c lose to i t s border cannot be ruled out, resulting in the Soviet 
union's st^}port to the largest# strongest and s tables t power in 
the region# i*e« India« which explains the successes achieved by 
64 
the Soviet pol icy In the subcontinent. These sue c»sses are in a 
large measure due to a sotaader ideological perception of the 
r e a l i t i e s in the region %*jl^ resulted in a durable partnership 
bet%<een the Soviet union ant? progressive bourgeois nationaliaiR on 
65 
the basis of a common plat f«m of enti-in^eriali^m. 
6 4 . Bhabani Sen Gi^)ta, T h e Soviet union and South Asia", In 
Roger E. Kanet, ed.« Xrt? SfiYin Vftf9fl ^B^ ti» PBYtlTOiBg 
L# PP» 120-21. 
65. Devendra Kaushik, o p . c i t . . p . 271 
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IKDO-PAK ANIMUS AKC TIffi SOVIET UHIOti 
Pakistan ten<^ to a t tr lb i t t« t o India a wnge^ul nale^^Xenoa 
v i t h no other p\irpos« th&n t o his-t Pakistan on the assuB)pti<»i that 
India has not reconc i l ed i t a e l f t o the energemas of Pakistan, that 
India means t o imperil Pakistan's s e c u r i t y , tha t India i s in 
c o l l u s i o n with the Soviet union, and that India i s only i n t e r e s t e d 
i n humiliating Pakistan and wrecklny i t s unity and t e r r i t o r i a l 
1 
i n t e g r i t y * 
The Pakistani percept ion that I^dia i s ovlt t o undo p a r t i t i o n 
has dominated Pak i s tan i ' s fore ign p o l i c y thinking ever s i n c e 1947. 
when India setout t o bui ld a secular s t a t e , says prof. Kaiia Bahadur, 
Pakistan took i t as a chal lenge t o the i d e o l o g i c a l bes i s of 
2 
Pakis tan. The 1971 c o n f l i c t r a d i c a l l y changed the subcontinental 
s tructure created in 1947. According t o Kalin Bahadur the c o n f l i c t 
"cut Pakistan t o s i z e and doomed i t s e f f o r t s t o claim and a t t a i n 
3 
p a r i t y with India forever.** This changed s i t u a t i o n c a l l e d for a 
r a d i c a l rethinking and reformulation of p o l i c i e s by both India and 
Pakis tan towards eacii other* 
1 . Rajendra sareen»^ pekistant The I»diA Factor . A l l i e d 
publ i ca t ion . New Delhi 1984, p . 2S* 
2* Kalim Bahadur, "India and Pakistan" i n Biael Prasad, e d . 
v i l e s « laew xselhi, p . 139. 
3* j;i2A&u' p* ^^ c>* 
83 
The sum tota l oi the part i t ion in 1947 ana the sub8«quent 
break %sp o£ Pakistan in 1971 i s that the Muslim coiM>onent oi the 
subcontinent stands s p l i t into three. The 1971 war was forced by 
Pakistan on India, fhe security iieperatives vihich determirie the 
responses ot a nation were so grossly violated by Pakistan that 
India had no option but to respond with force. 
Kashmir epitonises Pakistan's frustraticm as a nation that 
never attained conceptual f u l f i l i ^ n t . There i s wic^spread avfareness 
that short o£ war Pakistan canznt hope to achieve i t s aims in Kashmir, 
but war stands ruled out as a physical policy choice because i t has 
already been tried twice with disastrous consequences. It i s 
( f i ff icult to see any possible sh i f t in the present regalities on Ute 
ground as have ^velc^ied over a period in Kostanir. Neither incia 
nor Pakistan can abandon their posit ions in the present s i tuat ion . 
So the only possible ^ay out i s to leave the matter where i t i s 
and stop agitatiny over i t . Taking stand on the unexceptionable 
principle of national sovereignty does not provide a posi t ive 
input for the loiproveKient of relat ions but serves as a pointless 
4 
and f u t i l e i rr i tant . 
One of the major i rr i tants between India and Pakistan i s 
Pakistan** procl ivi ty to as*one a guardianshlprole in respect of the 
Indian Muslins. India Is perfectly right when i t claims the 
4 . Rajendra Sareen* SSjSiSk'* PP* ^ 6 ^ 1 * 
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outbursts of conMnuD^ l violence over an internal affair and no 
outsider has a locus standi in this oettter. There i s no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n fca: the intemperate ujaraaer in viiich Pakistan 
newspapers end p o l i t i c a l leacers deal with the subject. The 
approach i s propagandistic and s ingle dinensional. The thrust i s 
t o malign India, not to inform the public nor to ciscves the 
5 
i ssues involved. 
The history of Indo^Soviet relat ions with the lndi«in 
si;dt>continent goes back t o roeote past. Hehru declared on 
1 September 1946 that i t would be the policy of India to build 
good relat ions with the Soviet union an^ the USA. The establishment 
of diplonauic t i e s between India «ind the USSF; did not lead to an 
iiniaediate develofssient ox close relations* 
The v i s i t of presic'ent Ayub of Pakistan t o the USSR in i t ia ted 
a new era for the soviet Union in the af fa irs of the subcontinent. 
Both India and Pakistan were eager to l-)ave Moscow*s goodwill. India 
was anxious t t» t i t s long standing frien<aihip with Moscow not 
suffer as a result of the Soviet Union's new t i e s with Pakistan. 
Pakistan, on the other land, was desperately trying to 
reduce the «axquBli£led Soviet su^or t to India. Thus the Soviet 
Union acquired considerable leverage with both the countries. 
£ . I^ id . 
6. see Devendra Kaushik, j^oviet lUtlations with India and 
Pakistan, Vlkas, 1971. 
8S 
The cirarBOiK increaac i n the Sov ie t inf luence i n the subcontinent 
c e r t a i n l y would not heve bren looked t4>on :^avoiflrahly by the 
un i ted S t a t e s . Hie Soviet att^iqpts t o have s imultaneously yood 
r e l s t i o r ^ with Inria and paKistan proved* i n the end* no iT.ore 
7 
s u c c r s s f u l then the M»rican attempts to achieve the same o b j e c t i v e . 
Turing the consu l ta t ions before the 1965 yim» the s o v i e t 
leaders may have assured the Indian prime Minister o£ a spec ia l and 
continuing reftationship* iMit they did not p u b l i c l y s\;q3part India 
or c»ndeiimed Pakistan with no oM^ntion of Kashmir o" any other 
controvers ia l Inao-pakistani problem. The communique i ssued a t 
the end oi Shastr i*s v i s i t contained nothing t o wnich Pakistan 
8 
cou ld take except ion . 
This changed thinking became more ev ident during the armed 
c o n f l i c t o£ 1965. The s o v i e t reporting a f t e r the war was 
unsensational i n s t y l e and scrupulously impartial i n content . 
Xosygin appealed t o both Ayub and Shastr i t o s top f i g h t i n g , when 
t h e cease -^ ire was s igned Kosygin expressed h i s yovernnent*s 
s a t i s f a c t i o n . Only the s o v i e t union* thanks t o it.s new posture of 
n e u t r a l i t y i n India-Pakistani disputes* could ^dmiriand the confidence 
of both India and Pakistan. In sponsring the Tashkent Conference 
the peacMHnaking \3Psn achieved what was regardec by large segments 
7 . G.w. Chaudhury* o p . c i t . . p . 47 . 
8» I^^d.* p . 4 3 . 
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of the v.estern press as one ot i t s <^reQt.emt diplomatic feats 
s ince the secoiid %orld ii^ar. 
The Tashkent d e d s r a t i o n disappointed raany *^ *=qplc because 
i t broiK-ht no f inal so lu t ion to the Indo-mr^istani problems. I t 
produC'. d IK> wore than a shor t pause i n the course o. oerennial 
Indo-p>aKlstani disputes and tensiofis* AS t h e a r c h i t e c t of 
Tashkent* the Soviet Unior4 ««as not harpy* en<5 i t urgec b^^th s ides t o 
toeep up the T- shkent s p i r i t . In the previr.ua yesrs the USSR had 
invar iab ly biaiaed paivistan, but nj^ due to b e t t e r an<rrrjLancing 
between the tvio countr ies* pa^4stan was not blamed a lone . The 
Soviet onion seined t o feel t ha t Pakis tan ' s fears over trie jnassive 
arms bui ld \jp i n ^ d i a v«re both ^enui i^ anc reasonable . The 
Soviet lAiion did not wish to reduce i t s railit.ary srdpments to India , 
but i t coulc^ IK) l o i t e r i.e ind i f fe ren t t o Pakis tan ' s request for 
m i l i t a r y supp l i es . "Rye Soviet leaders asked £ :>r more time t o 
cecide on peKist -n 's request for arms. 
Furinc, h i s 1968 v i s i t to pakis t -n K sy^ in agreed to s e l l a 
Riocest quant i ty of artos t o Fak-ist^ri, Tnis marked a yrar.d success 
for Ayub's diplootacy* viith the cecisi;,n to s e l l arms to uKistan* 
the Soviet uni :n emerged as most important and xr^ luent ia l i n Uie 
a f f a i r s oi the subcontinent . I t was a renerkable diplomatic 
achievement. According, to G.K. Chaudhur^* "within iiifteen y ta r s 
t he soviet union rsc: r i sen trcw* a s t a t e of hardly any pov.er i n 
e i t h e r India or feKistan to t^cotne the dominant fcarei(^n agent* 




In €£.rly 1968 i t l a s anr.ounc. d t ha t Kosy^jin %*oaia v i s i t 
Zncia. r e k l s t - n ims unable to vitv» t h i s (^velopoit-nt witi^ equaniinity 
p a r t i c u l a r l y v^l^n Kosygin had postponed i»ls v i s i t to r«i.istc,n from 
time t o t ime. The press In paKist n cri t icisecS the supply oi: a v s 
t o Ind ia . The c r i t i c i « n i n pakis t n of the Soviet policy oi. 
supplying arms only to inc'ia oeds the Soviet prime Minister Kosygin 
decide to pay an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to ]^ . . i s ten . 
Kosygin's v i s i t was designed t o s t a b l i z e Soviet re la t i : ;ns 
with Pakis tan. On 19 April 1968, curiiit, liis v i s i t to ;aj.i t an 
Kosygin affirmed the t " the friendship between pakisteu <-.r« the 
Soviet Union would continue to ^^ row trom s t r eng th to s t r e n g t h . 
AS for Indo-pakis tani r e l a t i o n s Kosygin emphasised tliat "the 
Soviet Union had deep inter* s t i n the promotion of peace in the 
region and had# t i^refore# arrangGd a stf tnit rocetincj betv^een the 
10 
leaiters o^ the tMo coioitries .** The Jo in t Coar.unique issued a t the 
end or the four day o f f i c i a l v i s i t of Kosygin to Pakistan saic" 
t h a t the two countr ies were liappy v i t h the s t ea ty tevelopmvnt of 
cooperat ion in p o l i t i c a l , commercial* econcanic, c u l t u r a l , 
11 
ocicnt iJ- ic and technolos»ical f i e l d s . 
9» 2kk^" P» - *• 
1 0 . pakiatfen Times. 2c April 1968. 
1 1 . I b i d , . :2Ap>ril 1^68. 
I'iasysio's v i s i t to Pakistan was a netural c u l r i n a t i o n of 
the contacts t h a t haa developed between tlK: two countr ies a t 
var ious leve ls dijuring the pas t few years . The i r s" ei^r-ec t o 
increase economic anc technical aid t o pa is tan t o assoage i t s 
ru f f l ed fee l ia^s over the continued supply of a ess to I n ' i a , 
Horeover t t e liSSii v^ as ceeply cooctrned over the future of Fresicient 
Ayub KhBn# who had es tab l i shed warm personal rapport w t h the 
12 
Soviet l eade r s . 
The Soviet stand on the Inco-pak cxsputes has b«-en - u i t e 
cons i s t en t and prirjicipled# says Surendra Chopra, over the years . 
Soviet union's i t i t e res t in peace and s t a b i l i t y in an a r i a close 
t o i t s southern borders s t i l l rc-nains ivo ta l t o ics foreign ix>lic/ . 
G^oe r e l a t i o n s between Inc'ia anc Pakistan are v i t a l tor attairwf^nt 
Df peace «it^ St. u i l i t y in t h i s rc-vjion. Ihe Soviet Unior. unrerstenc^ 
i t very well. U a t tension in r e l a t i o n s between Ins iu ar.c l ak i s t an 
on y c rea tes f ov^ arable concitiorjs for in ter ference by outs ice 
povers it en area cloee to i^ -S borders n<" l^ence v i t a l for i t s 
s e c u r i t y . 
AOCordir.g to most p o l i t i c a l l eaders , dip^aofots anc 
conanentato-'S the US motives in seekin-j a secur i ty r e l a t ionsh ip 
with F^kistan i s the strateg^^c loca t ion of the country. I t i s f>;^ lt 
t h a t rB. is ta t . i s ii.portor.t to tlie i-es t^ because i t i s a t the roouth 
of the Gulf. But cit the same tirae there is an accute v v.areni-ss 
12. Trae incian Express, Kev. Delhi, 22 Ar^ril 1960, 
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o r i s i n g oiA of past expc^rienc» tht.t the I3^h i s er. unrel iable a l l y 
which would use Pakistan but do ix>thiixi to help i t i n i t s - u r su i t 
or: armed pa r i ty with Ind ia , 
I t v.ould oppetjr Uiat the U' A ,ants pakXst n t o - a l l i n l ine 
13 
i n tour v.ayst 
{£j creat-e and t4H»ra<^ por t and other i n t r a s t r u c t u r a l 
f a c i l i t i e s on the Mekran coast nc^ ^ r Gv>adar so Uiat 
i f USA c^cldes t o e c t i n whe Gulf area these could 
bc' used by i t s forces; 
(b) give an understanding t h a t should i t become necessary 
pak troops would be m a ^ ava i lab le to fxc^ht in purs a i t 
of US i n t e r e s t s in the Oulf a rea i 
(c) reassure USA on the nature of i t s r e l ^ t i o t s wj.th I ran 
and the ex ten t to which i t would 90 in search o£ f. 
so lu t ion of t l ^ Afghan problemi and 
(d) in order to niake one or more ot t^iese propositiorjs 
f e a s ib l e , iinprove i t s r e l a t i o n s with India because 
pakistc:n can rlcjy no worthwhile r ^ l e in the Gulf ii: 
i t remains an ac t ive adversary r e l a t i o n s h i p with India . 
ruriJC^ the 1971 war tlie usrp and Eastern European coontrit a 
s i ced with Incia vh i le the USA# Chin» ant. st^ie Kuslif countr ies 
we*-e with Pakis tan. The UK# Fr nee and scane other countr i s edoptec^ 
a neutral a^ti tucte. Eversimre the s t a r t of -he c i v i l vvar in East 
14 
Pakis tan , the U'SF. si^po ted the Indiati s t a n c . Tho USSR v.arncc the 
1 3 . Rajendra s reen, o o i c i t . , p . 49. 
14. Tht, Soviet Gov ri^ncnt was i n isvour o^ ; a p o l i t i a l so lu t ion on 
the problcan an<' condemned pakistar. ^ovcrrancnt a c t i v i t i e s in East 
Pakis tan. For cetaj-ls see S.S. Bindra, Indo-pak Rf^Iat;.ions^ 
Deep and reep Ful:>lications, t4ew Delhi, 1991, pp . 181-3. 
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other count r i . s t h a t tJsey should not t r y to ge t involve<3 i n the 
c o n f l i c t t h a t %ould**l€ad t o f\artter ciXBplic . t i o n o- t t e s i t u a t i o n 
on the Hindustan peni i»u la" . i h e Soviet warnir*, yms i nd i r ec t l y 
meant for China. Tfiis tjueely v^rnirig inc ica ted t!i«^t in Liie tm the 
US' R i.os c e r t a i n t o support t t e Incian s t^nc anc v. to the reso lu t ion 
which would not be £avoarable t o Incia* The l»SR o enly conaena»d 
the ro le s o* the US ana China in the vrar. 
The Soviet support c,ot a l l p ra i se in i nc i e f r » ' Vc.ri.us 
o rgan iza t i ons . The Sovi-1 anion wanted t o counter the 
.a8hin^tonopeKing->IslaniBbaa ax i s by forming a Has cow-Delhi-Dacca 
a x i s . The Soviet st;^:^jort for In<?ia le€ t o a p o l o r i a a t i . n of power 
i n the region when China ©nc the USA came out in open simport of 
Pakis tan erk^ ttse UfSR-i^k r e l a t i o n s seeroec t o have rever ted t o what 
15 
they were a dec: <« ear ier in the f i f t i e s . 
The USA s iaed with Pakistan during the 1.-71 *«ar in an utside 
the UfU Kl^n the war s t a r t e d the us cancelled anas sup l i e s to 
Xnclia anc F**: i s t a n . But curiny the v.ar p a t i s t n rejected .S arms 
16 
through t h i r d comttxics . There as widespread nycr in Xncia ayainat 
the liS Bn6 Mrs. Indira Gandhi s trongly aenounced the UZ po l icy . 
There was stron^, <^n<^mnation i n Incia ayains t thb 4S sen<.iuj o£ 
Sevcntii F i e t t . The Uf^ R fcJiS highly c r i t i c a l o- the "v^un-ijoat 
ciplomacy" o2 the JS anc took s teps t o prevent the Seventh Fleet 
15 . S.S. Bincra. o p . c i t . . pp. 181-3. 
16 . vinoc Gupta, f,Bf,€ f^fg|[| P^Pftyg - S t^t^ Y g^ KUOB'g &^9'^n 9f 
in<5ia. Delhi, 1972, p . 141. 
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from operating i n the fiay of Bengal, i b e us a t t i t u c ^ duriny the 
vrar as most r e p r e h e w l b l e . 
As for China's ro l e i n the 1971 V9JC» i t declared the East 
Pakistan c r i s i s as an internal a f f a i r of pakijit<an. Duriny the 
s i x t i e s China nursed a s t e a d i l y grovin^^ fr iendship with rakis tan . 
China opposed the crctati^a of Bangladesh as an independent s t a t e 
"una^r the Sov ie t influence* because i n i t s opinion the Sov ie t 
in f luence would reckon i t s s e c u r i t y on i t s w ^ t e r n and Southern 
17 
f r o n t i e r s . 
China's ^ d e r a t i o n s of a irport for Pakistan continued 
throughout the period O; the 1971 war. China openly denounced the 
"Soviet -Indian collusion** and accused Moscow of supporting Inoia 
w i t h "Milivary provacations** and "sudoversivs a c t i v i t i e s " towards 
18 
Pakis tan . 
1 7 . M. f«bih Sidky, "Chinese World Strategy and South Asiai the 
China Fsctor i n Znd.-Pakistani Re lat ions" . Asian Survav. 
v o l . 1A# NO. 10, Oct 1976, p . 970 . 
1 3 . Mehrunisa M i "China's diploniacy during the pak v.a , 1971", 
Pakistan Horizon. Vol . 2&, Ho. 1 , 1972, p . 56, as Quoted i n 
S .S . Bindra, ^MS^»» P» 187. 
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COtiCLlBION 
Ind ia and P a k i s t a n eraerged on the world mar a s s o v e r e i g n 
independent c o u n t r i e s i n August 1947» bu t t h e i r r e l a t i o n s a r e 
s t i l l s t r a i n e d . P a k i s t a n was born out of c e r t a i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . 
I t vi&s e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e p r e c a r i o u s balaiKse between an ui.riatural 
geography and a horde of warr ing e t h n i c r e g i o n a l l o y a l t i e s . 
Af te r n e a r l y four decades o- i t s b i r t h P a k i s t a n Is ye t unable t o 
e s t a b l i s h an i d e n t i t y of i t s own o r even t o g ive i t s e l f a sound 
ceiBocratic c o i » t i t u t i o n » The r e l i g i o u s fanF^ticisni con t inues t o be 
one of the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Pak i s t an vAiich i s symbolized by 
t h e o f f i c i a l name g iven t o the coun t ry " I s l a m i c Republ ic of 
P a k i s t a n " and by t h e p o l i c y i t has adc^ t«d towards Kashmir. This 
f a n a t i c i a n has widened the gulf between Ind i a and P a k i s t a n . 
The people of Pak i s t an cons ide r Ind ia a coun t ry of Hindus and 
i n t h e i r op in ion s ecu l a r i sm i n India i s a "hoax** because they f e l t 
t h a t Muslims a r e not t r e a t e d a t pjar wi th Hindus. Both the c o u n t r i e s 
f e e l t h r e a t e n e d by each o t h e r and have been s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r 
d e f e n c e s , spending roajcMr p o r t i o n of t h e i r budgets on armed f o r c e s . 
^^ o f a r t h e y Ymve foiKjht t h r ee major wars , s h a t t e r i n g t h e i r economy 
and s a c r i f i c i n g thousands of human l i v e s . 
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Mr 2»A. Bhutto vja» of the view that "in the des truct ion of 
1 
Pakistan l a y lnc ia*s raost s o b l i a e and f i n e s t dreams." " « are f u l l y 
avare oi the treacherous nature o f India and vie do not want to 
2 
endangf-r the e x i s t e n o s of Pakistan i n the name of cooperation." 
pres ident Ayub Kh&n often talked of "India *s w ib i t i on t o absorb 
Pakistan." £ven the present president z i a o l Haq who i s acclaimed 
3 
as nwAi more r e a l i s t i c than h i s predecessors shares t h i s view. 
There i s a general b e l i e f among the Pakistanis t ^ t before 
1.4 7 they were t i g h t i n g two enea ies t the B r i t i s h in.perial 
domination anc" cult \ s -a l r e l i g i o u s system of the Hincus. v.hereas 
t h e f i g h t aga ins t co loo ia l i sm i s over many b e l i e v e that a c o n f l i c t 
with a "Hindu India" s t i l l cont inues . The Pakistani leaders be l i eve 
t h a t the very e x i s t e n c e of Pakistan i s an i r r i t a n t t o India and as 
long as India attempts t o maintain a secular s t a t e * a t r u l y re l ig io iu i 
s t a t e such a s * Pakistan i s a provocation t o India ' s s t a b i l i t y ! 
The Pakistani pi rcept ions ot IndiB are aggravated by 
Paki s tan ' s c r i s i s of i d e n t i t y and fear of absorption - p o l i t i c a l 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and e^>r.aDic by India . Pakistani leaders have 
vel^mently t r i e d for and i r ^ i s t e d upon a par i ty of s t a t u s with India 
1 . Pakistan Kational Assembly Debates, lb March U^t, p . 496. 
2 . The Times of I n c i a . Delhi« 6 June 1966. 
3 . Mohammad Ayub KirAn* Friends not t e s t e r . P o l i t i c a l Bioufi^phv. 
Loi^on* 1967, p . 115. 
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both at the regional and International level* paAist&n vants 
the same statue* tlK; sane posit ion and the s^ne previleges which 
are attained or enjoyed by India. The primary &im o£ foreign 
policy of Pakistanis equality of status with Indias Pakistan 
reacts hysterical ly to any suggestion that Zi^ia out ranks her 
i n prestige or status* 
Pakistan v4is created on obsession for sectflrity against 
India ana t: reduce by whatever means the imbalaiK» between 
Pakistan and India. It was in ttJ.8 l ight that Bhutto t^d said that 
4 
"Pakistan wi l l always need plus factor for copiny with India." 
It was t :ds need zor a 'plus factor* that mads Pakistan 
turn to Musliai countries and British Comnonwealth anc to becone 
*the most a l l i e d a l l y oi the US in Asia« to seek for a big period 
the friendship of &>viet imion i n ora»r to neutralize tl-ie soviet 
5 
help to India•** i t raay be s inr ly aaid that the IslanabadHi^ashingtoi»-
Peking Axis i s the? result of t h i s Pakistan search for 'plus factor*. 
The search for the equality of status i s the result of the 
search for a national identity* There i« alsiost everything in 
cowon between India and Pakistan except the complexion of the 
majority and both belong to a s ingle c i v i l i z a t i o n area. The c r i s i s 
ident i ty a lso results frosi a geographical factor. According to 
4* £.A. ttiutto. Pol i t ica l Situation in pakistar.. 1968* p. 25. 
S* f^ ohaonnad Ayub Khan« o p . c i t . . p. i 30 . 
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Ari£ Husaln* "Pakistan i s concloos o£ the fact that 
geographically i t vas never an ent i ty . A conquered Egypt 
would s t i l l renain Egypt but Pakistan would be for^jotter. i f 
i t were* say annexed to another s tate for i t tfould lack the 
6 
national unity to preserve i t s ident i ty . 
I t i s for t h i s reason that Pakistani e l i t e i s wary 
of any cooperation with India. 
I I 
Pakistan's close proximity to Soviet borcers has 
been an important factor in Kk-emlin's att itude towards 
Islamabad. Accordingly* about the presence of us bases in 
6. ATif Misain* Pakistani I t s Ideoloav and Foreign Policy, 
1966* p. 64. 
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Pakistan. It had a l l along endeavoured t o keep Pakistan 
away from host i l e groupings or influences* be that of 
e i ther the USA or China or both. The iorcMnlin could never 
think o£ writing o££ Pakistan altogether, though i t often 
deemed i t necessary to take countervailing neasures to 
safeguard i t s v i ta l national idberests . Despite the slogans 
that were raised about Hindi-ltusi->Bhai«.Bhai« Indo-Soviet 
re lat ions had a l l along been based on considerations of India's 
u t i l i t y in Soviet calculations as rec^ards i t s regional and 
g1obal requirenents• 
For s in i lar reasons, Moscow had never missed any 
opportunity to cult ivate relations with Pakistan, that has 
always been the case throughout the Stal in period, the 
7 
Khrushchev Era and the Brezhnev-Koeygln phase. The rulers 
of Pakistan aspired to reap greater benefits by aligning 
thenselves with the Keetern Powers. The l^A, with i t s 
8i4>erior military and economic resources and tretaendous 
p o l i t i c a l influence in the world, held c^reater attract ion for 
Karachi. Washington was <s>Dsidered more suitable by Pakistan in 
helping i t overcoiae i t s eoonomxc d i f f i cu l t i e s and in fac i l i ta t ing 
7. J . p . j a l n , g g y m ffllyY 'SV^M^ PlH^t^p ^^g ftHWltflifn* 
QUMSIL'* 19TA, p. 195. 
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the real izat ion of Pakistani objectives in international field* 
particularly the settlement of the Ksslnir problem to i t s 
s a t i s f actions 
The lAilted States on i t s part* f e l t attracted to%.ar^ 
Pakistan because o£ the latter*8 strategic location and close 
prox in i t / to the Soviet union. The ccHistruction of us bases in 
Pakistan was considered very useful* in the event of a pc^sible 
conf l ict* in Biounting crippling attacks on the military instal lat ions 
in the rural region a no the inciustrial ^xnplexes of Soviet central 
Asia. The Kremlin even suspected that Karachi's will ingness to 
cooperate with Washington might enable the la t ter to lure "the 
Arab countries to enter the military bloc and putting i^essure on 
India." 
After Sta l in ' s demise* mienkov stated tltat the "Soviet 
union attaches great Importance to the suK:essf ul development of 
re lat ions with Pakistan and <»:> strengthening of ev<.ry kind of 
re la t ions between the t%fO s t a t e s , l^ favourable response was* 
ho%iever* :ortJ.«)ralng from Pakistan* which persisted i n i t s attempt 
to consolidate i t s l inks with che united States . In the circuBStan-
ces* MOSCOW could not have remained indifferent to the s teadi ly 
growing rapport between paklstc n and the USA* especial ly in the 
direction c^ forgir^ a military a l l i e n s which was directed against 
g . Pravda ukrai^ nv^ 7 April 1953, c i ted in Raghunath Ram* 
S9Y^% MtA^tt^ <^m P9i4cy yg*^ffli pti^tiHii m7-i?^^i 
ph«D thesis of JIU* Mew Delhi* 1973* p. 62. 
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!JS«^ R the Kremlin eiu^eavoured to dissuede Karachi f ro. follovviny 
such a "oangeroiui covBTse," 
^.ftor Fakist.an joined the %i«stern a l l i a n c e systems anc 
cas t i t s l o t viith the en^eies ot the US"', : oscot- r e a c t . c by 
extendiny f u l l s i ^por t to In r i a an Kushrair anc^ t o Myj«nis tan on 
the pakhtoonistan issv^* the two nost v i t a l q v r s t i ns coricerning 
Pakis tan . In the face of keen corapetitic^rs with washincjton, the 
Kren-lin f e l t t h a t i t had r» Qlte^^mLive but to forc^e c loser and 
f r i e n d l i e r r e l a t i o n s *Kith Ind ia , which* l i ke the Soviet union, i^ as 
vehemently oppos d t o tiie western a l l i a n c e s . 
There v,as a dispute on the adjustotent OL the border and a 
iniiii %iiar was fouyht joetweeii Ii^ ULa and p<£>,-vist«>n i n April-4iay 1965. 
The mini v^r had convim^d pres icen t Ayub that the rakxstai.i 
so lc ' ie rs were axxpe io r t o t h e i r Inciori counterparts ^rx< tikjt in a 
R.ajor ii»r India could loe ea s i l y defeated by r<iVvistan, i t hed a l so 
coiwinc*jd Pakistan t h a t the USSR, I n c i a ' s inain sjroi^thizer \vOuld 
retuain n e u t r a l . Ti^e v i s i t ot president Ayiib t o Moscow if. the 
second week of April 1965, can be l inked wxth the t oubles in Kutch. 
The a Jill o£ Ayub*s Vis i t vaa t o weakexi the Soviet sympathy for 
i n r i a . TlKJugh the USSR adapted a n o i i - ^ r t i s a n a t t i t u d e ourintj the 
war, i t s o f f i c i e i newspaper, p^avda, c r i t i c i s e d • r r ' ac t ionar ies ' 
and • imper ia l i s t s • tor usi ig the Indo-pak conf l i c t t o achieve 
t h e i r own yoals anc al::o r e f e m d to the Sino-rat, f r iendsr . ip . 
Ucstv^i/le conditiorjB within Pakistan and Yahya Khan's 
unsyrop&thetic a t t i t u d e tovards Soviet proposals regarding re<jiorial 
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economic cooperation anc Asian Collective Security led Koscow to 
suspend i t s ams <^liveries to Zslaaabad in 1970. Soviet concern 
about the £ast Bengal tragedy was reflected in podgorny's l e t ter 
o:: 2 April 1971* yahya might have l i s tened to his advice as regards 
a p o l i t i c a l settlefnent in the natter* had there been no extreniat 
forces*' pressure within Pakistan and had Yehya not received any 
sustenaiwe and support which he managed to secure from other sources« 
China in particular. 
Sino*US rapproachmect and Blmtto's v i s i t to China in 
November 1971 affected the Soviet perception of i t s rei^ional and 
global in teres t s . In the circumstances Moscow deemed i t prudent to 
render strong p o l i t i c a l support to India by concluding a Treaty of 
Frientehip and Cooperation with Kew Delhi. The signing o£ the 
Indo-Soviet Treaty did not imply that Islamabad had ceased to be a 
factor in Soviet pol icy . In the USSR-India Joint Communique issued 
after the oancluslon of the Incb-Soviet Treaty* mention was made* 
presuntably at soviet insistence* of "the interests of the entire 
people of palcistan.* Subsequently* i n the Soviet-Algerian jo int 
Communique as v«ll« the Kreoain leaders did not forget to lay 
emphasis on "respect for the national unity and terr i tor ia l 
in tegr i ty of Pakistan." 
Islamabad* naturally enough f e l t very much concerned about 
the indb-ltoviet Treaty. Neverthless* Pakistan decsaed i t ne^ssary 
t o make "al l-out ef forts to maintain bi lateral re lat ions with the 
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Soviet uaion." obviously zslaaftbaa cotd.d not hope to gain anything 
by the deterioration of relatione %>lth Moscow* At unofficial levels» 
there was much qpen crltlclsre of the Zndo-atvlet Treaty* Btmtto 
described I t as "a pact of aggression* which was "bouiM to embolden 
Hew Delhi t o eitidark on an adventurist {» l l cy vl8-a<-vls Pakistan and 
ChliSi*' • Qayyum Khan and Maudodl a l so c r i t i c i s e d the Treaty as posing 
a serious threat to Pakistan* Cawp* however* took a different view* 
I t suggested that the Treaty did not ylve India more elbow rooa. 
In fact* I t reduced It because Mcsscow did not want a war in the 
sub-continent and* therefore* would certainly want India to tread 
very carefully* 
on the eve of the Reagan administration's Inaugisration In 
1931* the subcontinent had reached a stage where things covKld havs 
moved In either of two possible ways* India and Pakistan could 
have begtm to nove towards building vp p o l i t i c a l trust by 
reassuring each other on their respective security concerns* 
This process would have paved the way for the two countri^ s to move 
towards closer geopolit ical perceptions with a view to steering 
c lear of s^per power rivalry* This would have been followed by 
forging cultural and economic t i e s * Peace and amity asioni^  these 
two nstions would have opened vp the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a p o l i t i c a l 
settlement in Afglanistan* the essent ia l ingredients of which would 
be cessation of insurgency to the extent i t operates from Pakistan* 
wlthdra%#al of the Soviet troops* emergence of a Ix-oad based 
§ • J*P* Jain* op«cit«* p , 203« 
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goverx»ient i n Kabul enjoying pqpular support* recognition oi the 
Durand Line as the international frontier between t^kistan and 
Afghanistan* «ne nonoalisation of relaticms between tliem to the 
ID 
extent that the refugees in paicistan might return to their horaes. 
Pakistan's partnership with USA has already turner- i t s 
thoughts away from the need to build po l i t i ca l trust with India. 
I t i s t h i s inpact on Pakistan's thinking that worries India for 
more than spec i f ic it^ins of sophisticated har<^4are. uncer us 
oronptings* Pakistan professed peaceful intentions for & while, out 
the i r r i t a b i l i t y anc sharpness thct have recently characterised 
o f f i c i a l and media cooraient in paiU-st^n provide an indication that 
the earl ier raoaeration was merely cosnet ic . 
Tlte prc^jaganea barrage against i t i^twithstanding, incia has 
« 
a very v i ta l stake in seeking the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan. Ihe restoration of Afghanistan's status as a buffer 
between the Soviet unicm and the subcontinent i s of crucial s i g n i -
ficance for the peac» a£ t h i s region. Afgnanistan cat not be a 
buffer betv^en rakistc.n anc the Soviet Union because there i s no 
comparison bet%*een power reach* s iae and capacity of the two. i f 
Afghanistcin i s to re-^aerge as a buffer i t can only be between the 
subcontinent anc: the Soviet Union anc the sub«cor*.inent i s of 
crucial significance for the peace of th i s region. 
l b . Rajendra Sareen, Pakistan the India Factor. 1984, p. 29. 
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Those who t a l k o£ pckistan as a buffer between India and 
the Sov ie t tmicm s i t t i n g beycitd the Khyber pass , accoraing to 
Hajeni&'a Sareen# do not r e a l l y know wl»t t l^y are t a l k i r ^ about. 
Commenting on the ro l e of r-akistan as a buffer s t a t e t ro f . Sareen 
s a y s , "a buffer ro l e i s incoiui istent v/ith Pakistan's i l l - c o n c e i v e d 
zea l t o a t t a i n a tvfo-frant mi l i t ary c a p a b i l i t y a^^ainst the Sovie t 
union ana Ind ia . Even othertf^ise Pakistan's involvement with USA 
turns i t in to a component o£ h o s t i l e conf igurat ion against the 
13 
Sov ie t unicm." 
17., Rajendra Sereen, OD.cit«# p. 30 
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